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The subject of mergers first became of interest to me in
July of 1954 when, as part of an assignment at Northeastern
University, a paper on the topic was required. The Preface of
that work stated that it was hoped further study could Justify
more valid assumptions.
An opportunity for such study was soon available when the
subject was considered for thesis work in partial satisfaction of
a Master of Business Administration Degree at Northeastern Univer-
sity, However, the scope was determined to be of unmanageable
length for such a purpose, and additional time was necessary if
the study was to be accomplished. The completion of the project
was assured when the extent of the undertaking was recognized at
George Washington University. The required time was granted by
allowing the thesis to be submitted in two parts to cover two term
papers necessary in partial satisfaction of a Master of Public
Administration Degree at that University. Part I was submitted
on January 14, 1955. This is Part II.
In addition to the problem of time, the study could not
have been undertaken had it not been for the inspirational leader-
ship of Dr. Vincent P. Wright, Director of the Graduate School at
Northeastern University and Dr. A. Rex Johnson, Director of the
Navy Graduate Comptrollership Program at George Washington Univer-
sity. I am deeply indebted to these men for their help and under-
standing. A special note of gratitude is due Dr. Richard Norman
Owens and Professor Walter Packler of George Washington University
ii

who gave generously of their time and criticism. In addition,
personnel in the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice have been most cooperative and offered many suggestions
along with technical advice.
In making investigations for the original paper it was
found that considerable writings had been accomplished on the
various segments of the subject. Economic books offered a wealth
of information on monopoly and competition. Law Journals, U. S.
Statutes, and books on government regulation of business, fully
covered the law. Hany writers had attacked the problem of concen-
tration of industry as a result of mergers, and business periodi-
cals had a considerable number of articles on the reasons for the
present wave of mergers. In no place, however, was any current
writings found covering the full subject of mergers, per se.
It was difficult to understand such a lack of coverage on
so important an aspect of business. From a student's point of
view such writings were eagerly sought for a full but easy under-
standing of the basic concepts of the subject. As a result of
this fruitless search the form of the thesis took shape. Con-
siderable space is devoted to the early history of mergers while
the law of mergers is developed from its inception. This coverage
was deemed necessary to bring into focus conditions that may have
set the stage for the present merger movement.
A large portion of the material represents information
from secondary sources and liberal use is made of footnotes. Con-
siderable insight has been gained, however, from personal inter-
views with senior corporate officials from forty of the two hun-
iii

dred largest industrial firms in the United States. These offi-
cials were most generous in answering questions; however, mis-
understandings may have resulted from the interviews. If so, any
errors of interpretation are entirely my responsibility and, there<
fore, no authority is given for any quotations from this study
where such interviews are discussed.
The timing of the paper is regrettable in view of the fact
that the Federal Trade Commission and the Congress are working on
reports concerning the subject of mergers which will not be issued
in time for consideration here. In addition, the Attorney General
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws Issued its report
to the public on April 6, 1955» In view of the fact that this
paper had been completed at t^at time no opportunity was available
to incorporate the Committee's findings within the framework of thjs
study. However, the report of the Committee in no way reversed
the findings, conclusions, or recommendations of the work. A
brief outline of the majority and minority opinions of t^e Committee
are included as Appendix B.
It is hoped, that by the form of presentation and the in-
clusion of current information gained from industry and govern-
mental agencies, the work will contribute to an understanding of
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SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OP MERGERS
"Every single economic fact is always related to some
other equally important fact - and the practical man's
Job is to measure the relationship between the two." ,
R. D. Skinner, Seven Kinds of Inflation
An investigation of the writings on the economic aspects
of mergers reveals countless volumes, books, reports, papers, dis-
sertations, and treatises, dealing with the subject. Perhaps one
of the most complete works yet assembled is that prepared by the
Temporary National Economic Committee. During the years 1938-1941
extensive hearings were conducted by this committee which resulted
in the publishing of 64 volumes dealing with most facets of the
subject.
It is, therefore, obvious that no one chapter in a thesis
could pretend to outline and analyze the subject. It is just as
obvious that a thesis dealing with the nature and significance of
mergers would be incomplete without an examination of some of the
basic economic thinking in relationship to the formation and oper-
ation of business enterprise.
The purpose of this examination is to define and analyze
"monopoly," "big business," "competition," and other such terms
used in connection with the growth of firms through merger. In
addition, the economic advantages of mergers are explored as well
Quoted in Edmund Puller, Thesaurus of Quotations
, (New






as the possible success of such ventures. Special attention is
paid to the difference between the businessman's concept of com-
petition as opposed to the economist's concept.
The scope of the study takes the form of a general summa-
tion of views expressed by the economist, businessman, and govern-
ment, concerning the competitive structure of business, and the
effect on that structure of the growth of firms through merger.
It is important to note that this is considered only a general
summation of views. The divergence of opinion as described by
John Miller could well be the subject of a book.
Over a half-century of discussion ... of the effects of
big business on the character of the competitive process in
the American economy leaves us as far from a consensus as when
the debate began. 1
Definitions and Appraisals
In analyzing the various aspects of economics as they per-
tain to mergers, it iB necessary to define many of the terms used
by those discussing the subject of mergers and to appraise their
relationships. While the varied types of competition are consid-
ered, this is done from the layman's point of view and no such
narrow distinctions are made as those developed by Fritz Machlup
in his Monopoly and Competition .
Pure Competition
The basic condition of pure competition is that of price.
Only under pure competition will price actually be an accurate
John Perry Miller, "Competition and Countervailing Power:
Their Roles in the American Economy, American Economic Review ,





index of scarcity. It assumes that the only element which will
cause a buyer to prefer one seller to another is the factor of
lower price. This condition must have as a prerequisite that the
product offered be standardized or uniform and of such a small
proportion to the total supply that any change In the amount of-
fered for sale by one seller will not affect the price.
While "pure" competition and "perfect" competition are
most often used interchangeably some economists make the distinc-
tion that in perfect competition there is complete mobility of re-
sources with free markets.
Pure competition is considered as an ideal norm, or as a
measure of the freedom of business enterprise. Such measure to
the average businessman is as unobtainable as the measure of par
is to the average golfer. However, even this average golfer would
admit that such an "unobtainable" measure has its merits.
Few people would advocate today that the economy of the
United States could or should comply with the classical theory of
pure competition. Just as few people would advocate that it is
not feasible to preserve and to increase effective competition.
The problem, therefore, is not in the definition of pure competi-
tion as opposed to monopoly. It is one of defining effective com-
petition! It is here that the economist and the businessman most
often part company.
The economist looks at competition as economic activity
carried on by a large number of small units of business enterprise.
3ee for example: E. H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopo-
listic Competition , (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933).
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He will accept a lessening of the idea that there must be great
numbers of these units but when merger activity whittles away at
these numbers until there are but a few left, he can visualize
business rivalry but not competition. The businessman on the
other hand, faced with even one other enterprise in his field
usually looks upon it as a fierce competitor. It normally follows
that at this latter point of competition business will not auto-
matically be freely competitive.
Government then enters as the protector to preserve active
competition in private industry. As we have already seen, the
definition of active competition in the application of the anti-
trust laws differs considerably between the agencies of government
administering the laws enacted by the Congress and the courts that
have interpreted those laws.
Monopolistic Competition
Monopolistic competition recognizes that in every market
there are competitive as well as monopolistic elements. It is
usually referred to, however, as that portion of competition that
lies somewhere between pure competition and pure monopoly. It is
an area of competition that may or may not be called "effective
competition.
"
For some time writers have spoken of the "decline of com-
petition," or the "growth of monopoly." For perhaps an equal
amount of time others have questioned whether the economy of the
United States, or the economy of any country, ever really was
competitive. In this regard Edward Mason concludes:
At least a part of the present emphasis on concentration
arises, in all probability, from the illusion that at some
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not too remote period the economy was competitive.
Monopolistic competition encompasses such a wide range of
2
conditions that it is broken down here into two groups. The first
of these is what is quite generally termed the large group area.
This is an area of workable competition Involving many concerns
within an Industry. The second of these is the small group area,
where only a few concerns make up an industry. This latter situ-
ation is known as oligopoly or. duopoly in case of only two sellers.
Large Group Area.—Product differentiation is the point of
departure from pure competition into monopolistic competition.
Any consideration which causes a buyer to prefer one seller to
another is product differentiation. This still holds even though
the price of both dealers is the same.
The considerations which cause a buyer to prefer one
seller to another may be wide or very slight, real or imagined.
A preference for a particular brand of cigarette due to taste or
smell (real or imagined) is a classic example. The color of the
wrappings of a product, type of wrapping, availability of the
product, privilege of credit or exchange, advertising appeal, the
ability of salesmen to influence, and many more such differences
make for product variation. In some cases price is a factor, such
as willingness to pay for delivery, or willingness to walk a few
blocks to save money due to a lower price.
The effects of this type of competition may not be a great
Edward S. Mason, Explorations in Economics , (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1936), p. 433.
p
As described by Charaberlin, op. cit.
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deal different than under pure competition. Concerns are still
free to enter production areas. With some exceptions resource
allocation closely approximates that of pure competition. Incen-
tives to maximize efficiency are unchanged. Prices in most cases
remain market determined.
Contrary to production scales under pure competition, an
industry operating under monopolistic competition normally finds
that production in the long run will stop short of lowest possible
average costs. It should be noted that this type of competition
may well be far from monopolistic. In the large group area there
may be too many concerns - all of them of less than optimum size
or operating under capacity. In either case it would be a waste
of resources as viewed by the economist.
Immobility of resources is a condition that can affect the
functioning of workable competition under either the large or
small unit category. Labor is becoming increasingly immobile.
Competitive bidding for resources or services is greatly hindered
under these conditions.
In analyzing the antitrust laws and the objections to some
of the mergers, monopolies of buyers must also be considered.
These are termed as monopsony. This can be illustrated as a
buyer or group of buyers restricting bids for products so that a
price change may be forced for their advantage.
If the area of monopolistic competition approximates pure
competition, it might logically be asked why government policy has
been suggestive of control. The Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee made this point clear when it reported:
Non- price competition is of particular importance to the
standard of living of consumers because of the extent to
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which it affects retail markets and the everyday necessities
of life. The amount which a family must spend for food, cloth*
ing, groceries, drugs and cosmetics is related to the manner
in which business concerns selling these products choose to
compete, by the decisions to stress or skimp quality, to ad-
vertize more or less intensively, to pack simply or elaborate-
ly, to favor or oppose retail price-cutting, ,and so on. This
is clearly a matter of broad public concern.
Small Group Area.—>In reference to mergers, the concern of
the economist or government usually centers on the small group area
of monopolistic competition. The word small in no way indicates
the importance of the group. Quite the contrary, it is the pre-
dominant group which concerns this thesis. The word "small" is
used to indicate a small number of concerns making up an industry.
As previously stated, this is defined as duopoly or oligopoly. It
is the contention of the Federal Trade Commission that this group
is increasing at an alarming rate, and that the resulting concen-
tration of industry within a few concerns is a matter of grave
concern.
2
The investment banker and the corporate device of organi-
zation have been credited with making possible much of the early
advances in this country ! s economy. So also were they responsible
for making a system whereby capital funds required for the opera-
tion of huge concerns could be accumulated to an extent that mar-
ket dominance resulted.
It is this market dominance by a few concerns that distin-
guishes an oligopolistic industry. It has often been considered
Temporary National Economic Committee, Price Behavior and
Business Policy , Monograph No. I, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1939)/ P. 59.
p
Federal Trade Commission, The Merger Movement: A Summary
Report , op. clt. , p. 7.
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that this group represents a form of monopoly, which Is probably
true to some degree. However, the businessman who finds himself
In this situation of market dominance more often than not con-
siders that he Is operating In the most brutal form of competition
yet Invented.
In the discussion of pure competition it was found that a
seller had to concern himself little with other sellers. One of
the characteristics of oligopoly is that each of the concerns
takes specifically into account the policies of its major compet-
itors in setting their own policies. It is here that the economist
looks with distrust at administered prices, legal protective de-
vices, exclusion of competitors, growth by merger, and nonaggres-
slve competition. It is here, also, that the antitrust laws have
endeavored to outlaw collusive price fixing, restraints of trade,
and spell out aggressive competition and permissable integration
of industry.
It was considered under the large group area that product
differentiation with or without price considerations, was the
basis for monopolistic competition. In oligopoly, nonprlce com-
petition has, for practical purposes, replaced price competition
in many sectors of the economy.
George Stigler points up the views of the alarmists when
he states:
When a small number of firms control most or all of the
output of an industry, they can individually and collectively
profit more by cooperation than by competition . . . (such as
the charging of non-competitive prices). . . . These few com-
panies, therefore, will usually cooperate. 1
10eorge J. Stigler, "The Case Against Big Business, n
Fortune , May 1952, p. 123.
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One of the best examples of an oligopoly Is In the auto*
mobile industry. There are three predominant firms, i.e., General
Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. Stigler's views of cooperation would
fall on deaf ears in this industry, even although he might be able
to prove that prices follow a pattern.
The automobile industry can make a good case for itself
as a competitive industry, yet it is in areas such as this that
the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice keep a
watchful eye. Of this J. K. Galbraith takes exception and notes:
. . . the Federal Trade Commission^ stand that identical
pricing and "conscious parallelism" are the same as collusion
if their consequence is substantially to lessen competition 1has set a legal basis for prosecuting bona fide competitors.
Monopoly
The man who owns and operates the only theater in a town
has in a real sense a monopoly. So also do the owners of certain
gas stations or grocery stores in small towns have monopoly enter-
prises. However, the monopoly that concerns the subject of mergers
is the one where a firm controls 100 per cent of the production of
a product (or demand in the case of monopsony) or such portion of
the production that it can, by restriction of output, bring about
a favorable price change.
The most common monopolies are those that are fostered and
protected by law, namely telephone, telegraph, water, gas, electric
light, street railway, etc. In addition, this country has through
laws enacted by Congress given monopolistic status to the bituminous
J. K. Galbraith, American Capitalism , as cited in
Fortune , June 1952, p. 19^.
:
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coal industry, and by many of its practices (such as regulation of
crop acreage) built into the laws or regulations monopolistic tend-*
encies.
Beyond this, most cases of monopoly, especially in the
manufacturing field, rest on patents or other barriers to entry.
Patent monopolies are protected and fostered by the laws of the
country. Other simple monopolies have as their basis, the control
of raw materials or financial backing.
Perhaps with the exception of the public utilities and
possible patent control, few concerns could be listed that had
100 per cent control of an industry. The Aluminum Company of
America at one time had this maximum. However, by the entry of
Reynolds Metal, among others, and a wave of substitute products,
their position is anything but a pure monopoly now.
The problem of defining monopolies, when control is some-
thing less than 100 per cent, becomes increasingly difficult.
Once concerns were found with substantial holdings of raw mate-
rials, it would have to be proved that these holdings were suf-
ficient to administer prices. So also would it be difficult to
prove that entry into an industry was impossible even though it
might take one hundred million dollars.
As was pointed out in the chapter on "The Law of Mergers,"
market control of a product no longer guarantees monopoly. In the
case concerning duPont's control of 75# of the cellophane wrapper
industry it was proven by the dependent company that this control
only constituted 17.9 per cent of the total flexible wrapper in-





contention of "a monopoly in restraint of trade."
For a better understanding of the problem of defining mo-
nopolistic concerns, when control is less than the 100 per cent,
unquestionably the duopoly or oligopoly has to be considered.
While there are other shoe machinery concerns, it is questionable
whether they have significant influence on the practices of the
United Shoe Macninery Corporation. It is just as interesting to
explore market control in the plate glass field.
Pittsburg Plate Glass and Libby-Owens control 90 per cent
of the industry. While it might possibly be proven that there was
not the aggressive competition between these two concerns required
for pure competition, it would be impossible to prove that either
could control prices by withholding production. Such might be the
case for a period of months, but the other concern would soon take
o
up the demand by increased output.
While his views are not shared by all,-* Schumpeter's
thoughts on the subject of competition are challenging.
The competition that counts is the competition from the
new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply,
the new type of organization (the largest-scale unit of con-
trol for instance) - competition which commands a decisive
cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins
of the profits and their outputs of the existing firms but at
their foundations and their very lives. This kind of compe-
tition is as much more effective than the other as a bombardment
1
United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours, 118 F. Sup. 4l
(1953).
discussions with T. W. Collins, General Personnel
Director, Pittsburg Plate Glass Co., Pittsburgh, Pa., personal
interview, November 195^.
^See The Review of Economics and Statistics , Vol. XXXIII




is In comparison with forcing a door* and so much more impor-
tant that it becomes a matter of comparative indifference
whether competition in the ordinary sense functions more or
less promptly. The powerful lever that in the long run ex-
pands output and brings down prices is in any case made of
other stuff. 1
Big Business
Big business has been variously described as "giant cor-
porations," "mammoth corporations," "corporate empires," "large
business," "massed capital," "modern business," and in many more
like phrases. Seldom are these used in a favorable sense, es-
pecially in view of the fact that many of them grew by way of
merger. Just as seldom has a uniform definition of big business
been acceptable to writers on the subject. Stigler states his
opinion thus:
Texas Gulf Sulphur is big business as it produces more than
half the sulphur in America and Macy's is small (whose annual
sales are much larger) because it sells only a very small
fraction of the goods sold by New York City retail stores.
3
It can be seen that by such a definition every one of the
more than three hundred thousand manufacturing enterprises would
have to be analyzed to consider whether they would fall into pat-
terns of market control that would indicate a meeting of the terms
of the definition. It might well be, also, that by the use of
this standard, many partnerships, or sole proprietorships, dealing
in unimportant commodities, could be classed as "big business."
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democ-
racy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947 )> pp. 84, 6*5.
2See John D. Glover, The Attack on Big Business (Norwood,
Massachusetts: The Plympton Press, 1954), pp. 1-14.
^Stigler, op. cit. , p. 123.
-:.-.!
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While such classifications as suggested above might seem
improper, an examination of economic writings reveals the opinion
by many that any departure from pure competition makes for big
business tendencies - tendencies that will make concerns act mo-
nopolistically.
Glover indicates that this term "big business" means more
to the critics than just a noun with a definition. He suggests
anything that opposes the social, economic, or political philoso-
phies of an individual writer on the subject becomes big business
to them. 2
It has been common for many writers and most U.S. govern-
ment agencies to speak of the 200 largest enterprises in differ-
entiating among the various concerns in the economy. For this
reason such a breakdown is considered appropriate to this study.
However, in no way would this eliminate the 201st concern or even
the 301st, if circumstances made it necessary.
What businesses constitute the 200 largest will in itself
be subject to considerable disagreement. Size can be measured by
total assets, net worth, gross sales, profits, etc.
If the term "big business" has taken on a connotation that
is not entirely desirable then where have these expressions of
distrust come from? Certainly the businessman is not writing of
how the economy is being disrupted by his actions. We have already
explored the fact that the courts have not outlawed bigness in
See for example Stigler, op. cit.
. p. 123.
Glover, op. cit. , pp. 6, 7,
.I
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Industry. Even Congress has not rushed in to plug any so called
loopholes in the antitrust laws. The amendment of the Clayton
Act in 1950 was the first such action dealing with mergers since
the passage of the act in 191^*
An examination of the critics of business quickly reveals
that the FTC, the Department of Justice, and a goodly portion of
the economists are the principal exponents of distrust. Stigler*
s
comments are typical of many when he says:
But in light of the widespread monopolistic practices - our
first criticism of bigness - it is impossible to tell the
public that its fears of big business are groundless. We have
no right to ask public opinion to veer away from big unions
and big government - and toward big business.
Such comments as Stigler's are perhaps startling to the
layman but must be examined in the light of other facts. Public
opinion has been polled as being just the opposite from what
Stigler paints it. The Opinion Research Corporation has given the
following breakdown of public opinion on big business, big unions,
2
and big government.
Question: In general has big business been a good thing or
not for the nation?
Good 800
Not Good Q%
Good & Bad 1%
No Opinion 5#




Stigler, op. clt. , p. 158.
p
Opinion Research Corporation, Princeton, N. J., as cited







One economist who appears to reflect the public's views
in this regard is John Oalbralth, who reports:
If business feels it hasn't fared well in presenting its
point of view it may be because it doesn't have a real
audience for its argument. The virtues of cleanliness as
it were, are belngjSold to a people who already appreciate
the value of soap.
If public opinion is truly reflected in the opinion poll,
it is evident that little public support will come for any anti-
big business drives if proposed by the Department of Justice, the
FTC, or the Congress,
Small Business
If it has been determined that for this thesis big busi-
ness will be interpreted as embodying the 200 largest concerns, it
is evident that the remaining firms will be classified as small
concerns. The problem, however, of identifying what small busi-
ness consists of in the eyes of the critics of big business is
something else again.
Small business is usually spoken of as "separate concerns,
"independents," "representative firms," "the small businessman,"
and in like terms. From the approximately three hundred thousand
manufacturing concerns, if we deduct the 200 largest corporations,
it is simple arithmetic to determine that we still have approximately
John Kenneth Oalbralth, "The Defense of Business: A
Strategic Appraisal," Harvard Business Review , Vol, 32, No, 2,
Karch-April 195^, p. 3^
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three hundred thousand manufacturing concerns which can be classed
as small business.
The growth of concerns in this country has previously been
mentioned , but it is important to re-emphasize the significance of
this so called "threat" to small business by way of the merger
process. Notwithstanding approximately five thousand mergers be-
tween the years 1935 to 195^ > there were still 50 per cent more
manufacturing concerns in 195^ than in 1935. Figure 1 illustrates
this growth. However, for true correlation, it would have to be
compared to normal growth and related factors. It still indicates
that small business has a permanent place in our economy. However,
notwithstanding these figures, there are disbelievers.
John Blair comments:
New entrants, while impressive in numbers, account for only a
microscopic share of total resources or activity, and conse-
quently have, little, if any, effect on the level of concen-
tration. • • •
The patent absurdity of this type of approach, which for
convenience, might be referred to as the "numbers racket,"
was brought out by Mr. T. K. Quinn, formerly a vice president
of General Electric. ... 'It is said that there are more
small firms in business today than there were before the war,
and that, therefore, economic power is less concentrated -
which is precisely like saying that because another million
Russians have been born, the Politburo has less control than
it had before.
Are Mergers Advantageous to the
Businessman or Society?
Not only are the critics of big business active on the
argument of competitive enterprise but they seriously question
^ohn M. Blair, "Statistical Measures of Concentration in
Business," Paper presented before the American Statistical Associ-
ation, December 29 » 1950. Mimeo Report as cited in personal inter-














the efficiency, ethics, success, and political implications of the
large industrial concern as well.
There has been little written by the businessman proving
that efficiency and the common good result from mergers of busi-
ness enterprise. This may be from lack of initiative or from lack
of facts. However, there has been a considerable amount of initi-
ative taken to disprove any such theories.
In the chapter on "Why Merge?" the reason of efficiency as
a significant cause of mergers was discounted. However, this does
not mean that it is believed that such factors are not important
to the success of big business.
Advantages of Mergers and Big Business
Owens lists an imposing array of possible advantages to
large scale operations but cautions that all probably would not
ensue to any one firm. The list includes: 1
1. Greater certainty of the supply of raw material.
2. The assurance of raw material of uniform quality.
3. Unification of purchasing departments.
4. The purchase of large quantities,
5. Specialization between plants.
6. Utilization of scrap in the manufacture of by-
products.
7. Reduction in the number of styles and sizes.
8. Closing of high-cost plants.
9. Saving on insurance.
10. More effective use of patents.
11. Reduction in number of salesmen.
12. Better service to customers.
13. Lower delivery costs.
14. Saving in cross-freights.
15. Seasonal dovetailing of products.
16
•
Extension of the export trade.
17. Greater stability of earnings.
Richard Norman Owens, Business Organization and Combina-
tion , (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951-1953;* pp. 421, 426.
Is
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18. Better market for securities.
19. Greater financial reserves.
20. Better industrial planning.
21. Productive scientific research.
22. The exchange of information on costs.
23. Expert technical advice.
24. Economics of monopoly.
In addition to the advantages listed above, which might
accrue to the businessman, there must be added the advantages to
society. While such advantages may be denied by the critics, as
noted in the following section, it is highly questionable if small
business could have brought about the inventions and production
know-how that has characterized the American business scene, let
alone successfully produced the requirements for World War II.
As Owens goes on to point out, advantages of large scale
enterprise do not guarantee efficiency - neither are they a meas-
ure of it. The measurement of efficiency is an almost impossible
task. It is often based on resulting profits which at best is a
poor measure and might well not be for the common good. Other
measures might be lower prices to consumers, higher wages to em-
ployees or better quality products. None of these last three are
subject to general measurement due to lack of an appropriate yard-
stick with which to make comparisons.
Disadvantages of Mergers and Big Business
The critics of big business date back at least to Adam
Smith and his Wealth of Nations . Glover made an intensive study
of these critics and lists the following as the consensus of re-
Joinders to the proponents of the advantages of mergers or big
business:
1. Big business can f t be managed efficiently.
2. Big business does not owe its growth to efficiency.
-
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3. Statistics show that big business isn't efficient.
4. The economies of big business are not net for
society.
5. Big business holds back invention.
6. Big business is monopolistic.
7. Big business runs the country.
8. A big business oligarchy controls American business.
9. Big business controls the schools, the press, etc.
10. Big business runs the government.
11. Big business leads to fascism.
12
o
Big business has too much power.
13. The power of big business is irresponsible.
l5. Their power is used for antisocial ends.
15. Big business is responsible for big government and
big labor.
16. Big business is driving out small business.
17. Big business blights social advance and communal life.
18. Big business is transforming society. 1
Glover summarizes one wing of the economic attack on the
desirability of big business as: "We could have had an efficient,
prosperous, dynamic economy without big business, perhaps—or
o
probably—even more efficient and prosperous, and more dynamic."
R. S. Merian comes to the defense of the economist and
business when he points out:
A considerable number of economists, their curiosity stimu-
lated by monopolistic competition theorizing, have tried to
examine business behavior and policy formulation on a realis-
tic basis and have found that businesses do not, in fact, act
and think in terms of maximizing profits.
3
Another economist, A. D. H. Kaplan, puts in a strong plug
for big business and against its critics in saying:
Mergers and Integration, though obviously departures from pure
competition, can no more than business size be regarded as
having been predominantly anti-competitive in their conse-
See for many examples, Glover, op. cit.
Glover, op. cit. , p. 63.
^R. S. Merian, "Bigness and the Economic Analysis of Com-




quences. A public policy that Is hostile to, integration per
se is on balance an anti-competitive policy.
Still another economist, J. K. Galbraith, states the case
for business in a more dynamic way:
It is certainly hard to describe as monopolistic and therefore
antisocial an economy whose refrigerator industry sold the
astonishing number of 48 million units since 1940; whose radio
industry has sold the even more astonishing number of 188
million units since 1929* and whose television industry has
sold some 18 million units in five years. The competition
that made this possible may not have been classically perfect,
but who can deny that it has been effective* 2
Are Mergers Successful?
The measurement of success of mergers is compounded by the
difficulty in first measuring efficiency, as well as a determina-
tion as to what is meant by success. Success to the businessman
might not be success as viewed for society as a whole. Due to the
impossibility of measurement no statistics are available for the
latter.
Two studies of the success of mergers are the ones most
often quoted. These deal in success only as measured by earnings.
The first was by A. S. Dewing in 1921^ and the second by Shaw
h
Livermore in 1935.
A. D. H. Kaplan and Alfred E. Kahn, Big Business in a
Competitive Society , as cited by Fortune , Section 2, February,
1953, P. 13.
2Qalbraith, "The Defense of Business," op. clt. , p. 138.
^A. S. Dewing, :,A Statistical Test of the Success of Con-
solidations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics , Vol. 36, Novem-
ber, 1921, pp. 84-101.
Shaw Livermore, "The Success of Industrial Mergers,
"




Dewing studied the earnings of thirty-five corporations
which were the results of the merger of five or more "separate,
independent, and competing plants." This small number of examples
has at times been used to discount the importance of the study.
It was found by Dewing that the earnings of the component
individual companies previous to merger were, in general, more
than their average earnings during the ten years following such
consolidation.
Livermore, on the other hand, found that of 156 concerns
classified as obtaining a high degree of market control, 40.
4
percent were failures, 10.9 per cent marginal, and 48.7 per cent
successes. Of 172 companies studied that did not have a high
degree of market control, 45.3 per cent were failures; 6.4 per
cent marginal; and 48.3, successes.
The National Industrial Conference Board also did a some-
what similar study and their conclusions were summarized as
1follows:
1. In a declining industry, mergers are unable to prevent
the prevalent drift toward ruin. In an expanding in-
dustry both the small and the large company share in
the general prosperity.
2. In time of depression, the earnings of large companies
decline as do the earnings of smaller companies.
3. Some large companies have failed because of poor
financial structure.
4. Mergers offer no substitute for competent management.
All three studies are so old that it appears inappropriate
to be using them at this time. However, as they seem to be the
National Industrial Conference Board, Mergers in Industry
(New York: The Board, 1929) as cited by Richard Norman Owens in
Business Organization and Combination , op. clt. , p. 430.
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only such studies available we must surmise as to whether they
still apply. It appears safe to say that the report of the
National Industrial Conference Board would probably have consider-
able significance at the present time.
A measure of success of big business, but not necessarily
big business formed by mergers, might be the success of small busi
ness. Over the oast twenty five years it appears that small busi-
ness has done better in relation to the national economy than has
big business. In 1929 the 100 largest industrial corporations
earned 3.7 per cent of the national Income as profits before
taxes i in 1948 the figure was 3.3. The small or middle group of
business firms increased their share. While this study was an
important contribution to the understanding of the growth of busi-
ness in a competitive society, probably a study of the 200 largest
firms would have produced more pertinent figures.
Of the 100 largest corporations in 1909 only 31 remain
o
today. This is indicative of the ever changing pattern of busi-
ness. Figure 2 more vividly portrays the fact that, if big busi-
ness is taking over the country, it is a big business that appears
to have almost as many pitfalls as the "unprotected" small busi-
ness.
If business believes that mergers are the quick way to
efficiency and wealth, why are there not more such actions?
Table I clearly indicates that there are periods in our history
A.D.H. Kaplan and Alfred E. Kahn, op. cit. , as cited in
Business Week , February 7* 1953* P. 30.
2Kaplan and Kahn, Fortune , op. cit. , p. 5.
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Pig. 2.—The Changing Shares of Industries Represented in the
100 Largest Corporations (by assets).
Source: A. D. H. Kaplan and Alfred £. Kahn, Big Business In a
Competitive Society as cited in Fortune , Section 2,
February 1953 » p. 5.
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when very few such consolidations take place. In addition, there
is little written about the breakup of business empires or the
sales of unprofitable merged companies. Just because such sales
don't make as interesting reading as, for instance, the headlines
of another proposed Youngstown-Bethlehera merger would be, does not
make them any the less significant.
Figure 2 and several writers have indicated the heavy in-
tegration in the oil industry. That is true. However, in no
place has it been found that much was made of the recent sale by
the Atlantic Refining Company of most of their foreign sales or-
ganization to Anglo-Iranian Oil. Nor could more than passing
notice be found concerning the sale by Standard Oil of New Jersey
to Naugatuck Chemical of Standard f s rubber plants in Baton Rouge.
The FTC has said nothing in its reports of the disposal of
whole divisions or individual companies by big business, although
considerable activity in this direction can always be found. Re-
cent sales, for instance, were made by Eastman Kodak, Celanese
Corp., Phillips Petroleum, and others.^ Argus Camera and National
Distillers are two corporations who tried the merger route to
bigger success. They are still staggering from their losses which
^Discussions with John M. Schultz, Budget Manager, Atlantic
Refining Co., Philadelphia, Penn., personal interview, October,
1954.
discussions with J. P. Monahan, General Control Manager,
Naugatuck Chemical Company, Naugutuck, Connecticut, personal
interview, November, 195 2*-.
^"Merger Trends in the Chemical Industry," Commercial
and Financial Chronicle , March 26, 1953* PP. 1-43.
.
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ended by eventual sale. That there is a limit to bigness does
not have to be proved to the businessman. If he wasn't ready to
accept this doctrine the 200 largest firms would probably long
hence have owned the firms that they were capable of acquiring.
In the Chapter on "Why Merge?" the need of capable manage-
ment was discussed and this was listed as one of the present causes
of merger activity. It is interesting to note that in investi-
gating the subject of the divestiture of segments of corporations
making up big business, one case was found where a major subsidi-
ary was sold for the purpose of selling the management with it -
management that could not be disposed of otherwise!
Businessman's Competition vs.
Economist's Competition
It is worth while to consider here whether the difference
of opinion between the economist and the businessman as to the
value of big business and, therefore, the merits of mergers, isn't
primarily a difference of position. The businessman is the actor
while the economist observes. They are looking at the same set of
facts but can't seem to agree on what they see. The reason ap-
pears simply that the economist is looking at all the ramifica-
tions. He thinks in relationship to the total national income,
the allocation of resources, the distribution of income, etc. On
the other hand, the businessman usually looks at the profits that
ensue from his endeavors and nothing else.
There are indications that the economists are looking to




business for some answers. The businessman's attempts at an un-
derstanding of the economy have not been as notable.
Again, quoting from Glover on this matter:
There are signs that a number of economists are becoming
more Interested in the dynamic processes of growth, change,
and decline of firms and industries, processes, products, and
markets. More economists, also, may come to be much more
interested than they have been in the past in firsthand clini-
cal observation of business behavior and motivation. They may
come to be more interested in the vast range of human diversity
to be observed in concrete organizations, and less interested
in deducing, from a priori assumptions, the attributes of
idealized theoretical models. If this happens, big business
might once again come to be supported by a powerful intellec-
tual justification. New concepts, new research methods, and
so on, could lead to new conclusions. Conceivably, that
1
could happen. Perhaps this may come to pass. Perhaps not.
Before exploring these differences of opinions, once again
we should look back at what a monopolist is. Paul A. Samuelson
describes him so:
A monopolist is not a fat, greedy man with a big moustache
and cigar who goes around violating the law. ... He is
anyone important enough to affect the prices of the things
that he sells and buys. To some degree that means almost
every businessman, except possibly the millions of farmers
who individually produce a negligible fraction of the total
crop ...
Economist's View of Competition
As stated previously, the economist views the goal of com-
petition as an organized system which makes economical use of
scarce resources. In looking at business firms or industries,
certain tests are applied as a measure of that goal. Is the
1Qlover J op. cit. , p. 99.
p
Paul A. Samuelson, Economics, An Introductory Analysis
,
p. 39> as cited in J. D. Glover, The Attack on Big Business ,
op. clt. j p. 90.
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company or Industry efficient? Is there rivalry that tends to
push prices down toward the costs of the most efficient producer?
Is there proper quality competition? Is the firm or industry
progressive? Is there freedom of entry for other firms? Is there
a wide range of choice for buyers with adequate knowledge to exer-
cise this choice? Are its profits the result of efficiency and
progress or the result of monopolistic position? Is its ownership
widely held?
These tests are often applied against the model of pure
competition. That is because the economist gauges the intensity
of competition by its effectiveness in promoting consumer welfare;
an effectiveness that is believed more probable under price com-
petition.
He views with alarm the many substitutes for this price
competition. Advertizing, salesmanship, merchandising skills,
price discrimination, price leadership, differentiation of prod-
ucts, patents, franchises, dealer organizations, market share, and
many other such "monopolistic practices" which lead to charges of
collusion in restraint of trade.
His views are based not only on the classical theories of
competition, but on volumes of proven charges against the business
man!
Businessman^ View of Competition
The businessman's concept of competition is far less theo-
retical and certainly less discriminating. His first comment is
that pure competition never existed and, therefore, it has no




To the charge that price uniformity is evidence of collu-
sion the businessman turns a deaf ear. To him it is a sign that
unions have taken competition out of wages with strong government
support and he is compelled to pay the same as his competitor.
Freight rates have been set by an agency of the government and are
no longer subject to competition. Taxes are uniformly set by the
Congress. For a considerable portion of time in the past fifteen
years, the government set prices on commodities and still controls
certain segments of the economy in this respect. In addition, it
is claimed that a uniformity of price in rival products indicates
the competitive position of substitutes, thus debunking the claims
of monopoly positions due to patents or other market advantages.
In examining the cost of automobiles it can be seen that the
prices are uniform beyond question. However, a cost accountant
might quickly note that there is not much room for competition in
prices. After labor, freight, taxes, interest on investment, and
certain materials are procured, such as those requiring manufac-
ture by bituminous coal which has its prices protected by the
government, the only costs left subject to possible differences
are overhead and profit. As all firms have overhead and try for
a profit, the margin of possible differences is small.
Product differentiation and selling expenses are to him
the answer to monopoly or failure of the consumer to know that
substitute products are available to him. It is the heart of the





In essence, the businessman can't afford the luxury of
competitive theories (which he sees as not suitable for use by
unions or government in his behalf). He hasn't the time or in-
clination to dwell on the effects of his rivalry on the consumer
welfare. The goal of his competition is his own welfare. His
competitive practices depend on how hard his competitors press him
in his struggles to stay in business.
Summary
To the student, the vast differences of opinion held by
respected economists, businessmen, and government agencies is more
than confusing. It seems like a paradox that we live in what is
believed to be the greatest country on earth, yet important seg-
ments of the population still believe that we are heading for a
concentration of industry, through merger, that might well spell
ruination for our economy. Ross M. Robertson parallels this
belief:
By any measure we choose to take, the American consumer has
been progressively better off over the past half-century.
But in an economy bowed down by monopolistic restrictions this
cannot be J How has it come about that, despite the omnipres-
ence of oligopoly, more and more of this world's goods and,
services have U iade available to the run of humankind?
Are the fears of the critics of big business and mergers
as the route to big business justified 1 How much attention should
be paid to the critics? We might repeat the prediction of Berle
and Means in 1932 and see how empty their warning was on the
Ross M. Robertson, "On the Changing Apparatus of Competi-




expected day of disaster:
Just what does this rapid growth of the big companies promise
for the future? Let us project the trend of the growth of . .
. the twenty years 1909 to 1929* then 70 per cent of all cor-
porate activity would be carried on by two hundred corporations
by 1950. If the more rapid rates of growth from 1924 to 1929
were maintained for the next twenty years, 85 per cent of cor-
porate wealth would be held by the 200 large units. 1
We have already noted that during this period of twenty
years projected by Berle and Means, small business has been shown
to have gained] The concentration of business enterprise will be
explored more fully in the following chapter. At this time it
only has to be stated that business concentration has changed
little since 1932.
Perhaps the answer lies in the comments of John Perry
Miller.
Despite the long usage of the term competition and the central
place which it has in contemporary economic analysis and pol-
icy, it is a concept more often used than defined. Moreover,
it is a concept which has undergone a substantial, if imper-
ceptible, transformation since the days of Adam Smith.
. . .
Smith and his successors were detailed in their description of
what they were against. It remained for others to detail the
institutional requirements to preserve perfect liberty.
Another possibility is in the concept of "countervailing
power" expounded by Galbraith. It is his theory that:
1. Competition means that a seller f s power is checked
by those who provide a similar or substitute product.
In a system of competition the role of the buyer is
passive.
2. New restraints on private power have appeared on the
opposite side of the market: the countervailing power
of buyers or suppliers.
A. A. Berle and Gardner C. Means, The Modern Corporation
and Private Property , (New York: Commerce Clearing House, 1932),
pp. 40-41.
John Perry Miller, "Competition and Countervailing Power,
American Economic Review , Vol. XLIV, No. 2, May, 1954, p. 15.
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3. This countervailing power is a self-generating force.
Private economic power begets the countervailing power
of those who are subject to it. 1
Another advocate of the theory that the change is indica-
tive of a new force added to the economy is Arthur H. Cole:
More particularly I would raise the questions—which surely
I cannot pretend yet to answer; (a) whether there are not,
in the recently evolved structure of American entrepreneur-
ship, elements of self-justifying practices and points of
view, which have important economic or social consequences
—
not another "invisible hand," but at least a fruitful disposi-
tion of forces—and (b) whether the course of development
within American business life, in part forced by alterations
in social structure and by concurrent sophistication of gov-
ernmental controls, does not hold promise of a somewhat en-
during compromise position between the supposed necessary
alternatives of unfettered free enterprise and a planned
economy.
A suggestion for the government, posed by Frank H. Knight,
might well add another answer:
If society itself (the government) would stop fostering monop-
oly and restrictive practices and prevent admittedly "unfair
action, the problem would be vastly reduced in scope and se-
verity, one may even say well advanced toward solution—solu-
tion as the facts of life make possible.
3
The above statements appear to Indicate that all is well
with our competition and that consolidations of business enter-
prise might well not be the danger believed. If these comments
produce any such sedative effect on the critics, it is not evident
We can let Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney of Wyoming speak for those
desirous of outlawing mergers and big business:
. . . private enterprise is threatened ... by a general
failure to comprehend the change that has taken place and
As stated by John Perry Miller, ibid
.
, p. 19.
2Arthur H. Cole, "An Appraisal of Economic Change,"
American Economic Review , Vol. XLIV, No. 2, May, 1954, p. 36.
3Frank K. Knight, "Discussion," American Economic Review ,
Vol. XLIV, No. 2, May, 195^ p. 63.
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a failure properly to coordinate Government and business in
their relation to people. ... We have persisted in treating
these organizations as though they were clothed with human
rights instead of having only the rights which the people,
acting through their Government, see fit to bestow on them.
It will be Impossible even to begin the task of adjusting
Government to business until we realize that the modern busi-
ness organization has grown to such proportions that neither
the people, as individuals, nor-, through their local govern-
ments are able to cope with it.
In viewing the position taken by the FTC, the Department
of Justice, and the critics of big business, there appear to be
two answers. The government could go beyond anything it has yet
attempted in fostering monopolies, and take over many of the large
corporations in the form of foreign cartels. On the other extreme
it could abolish big business, if it could be defined, and go back
to an economy of small firms. Both conclusions seem ridiculous.
In this country big business has been a compromise between
cartels and a form of enterprise that would not have had the fea-
tures necessary to bring about large scale production—let alone
prosecute a war of the extent found in World War II. This does
not mean that the organization and policies of big business are
believed to be above reproach. Quite the contrary. Neither does
it mean that the government should not attempt to be the guiding
hand as a regulator of this so called "workable competition. " It
does mean, very decidedly, that it is high time that the business-
man, the government, and the economists sat down together to work
out the best ways to carry on "workable competition"—workable
competition as defined by Galbraith:
Workable competition has no use for collusion, monopoly, or
deliberate restraints of trade. But it puts the consumer's
temporary National Economic Committee, Investigation of
Concentration of Economic Power, Final Report and Recommendations ,
77th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 675*677.
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interest ahead of theory, and shuns perfect competition for
the sake of perfect competition. It makes allowance for the
fact that the American economy has delivered to people the
benefits that perfect competition was calculated to give* 1
Merger for merger's sake is to be condemned, and no eco-
nomic Justification for their existence can be seen. On the other
hand a prohibition of mergers, Just because they often cause what
is known as big business and a change in economic theory of opera-
tion, also does not seem to make sense.
It is anticipated that mergers will go on within their
cycles, business will measure the success of such ventures and
cast out the unprofitable ones, government will continue to make
loud outcries against big business taking over the country (in the
hope of stirring up enough attention so that proper controls can
be continued), and the economists will continue their debates in
line with their individual beliefs. Meanwhile, the economy of the
nation will continue to prosper.
cit. , p. 99.
Galbraith, American Capitalism , as cited by Fortune , op.

CHAPTER V
THE EFFECT OF MERGERS ON INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION
"Concentration may be a problem, but for better or worse
it is not threatening to engulf the economy." M. A. Adel-
man, Review of Economics & Statistics , November, 1951.
Although controversy has run rampant throughout the study
of mergers; in no place has it been greater than in the effect of
mergers on industrial concentration. Undoubtedly that is because
concentration ratios have often been taken as the "proof" of
whether big business is taking over the country or not. It would
appear that the facts, themselves, could produce a greater una-
nimity of opinion among the authorities. However, such does not
seem to be the case.
At this writing the controversy appears to have become a
shameful display of temper. It has been reduced more to an argu-
ment of methods of measurement than one of increased or decreased
concentration and less often than not is the role of mergers con-
sidered in the problem of concentration.
A. A. Berle, Jr. says of the writings that "Bias or at
least prediliction exists to a high degree wherever the problem
of concentration is touched."
A. A. Berle, Jr.. "Four Comments on The Measurement of
Industrial Concentration, ' Review of Economics and Statistics ,




Measurement of Industrial Concentration
While this chapter deals more with the effect of mergers
on industrial concentration and concerns itself less with the
technical statistical measurement tools used by the various writers,
some comment on the problem of measurement is deemed necessary.
No great effort is required to find continual reference to
phrases such as "concentration of economic power" in any writings
dealing with business or mergers. It is easy to 3ay and is Just
as easy to "prove" that if one concern ha3 assets of 100 million
dollars and another has assets of 50 million dollars the first
concern has twice the economic power of the other. From such an
assumption many questions develop. What is economic power? What
are assets? How are they measured?
It probably can be deduced that these questions are more
often asked than answered or defined. It appears that if they
have been answered they have never been precisely measured
i
There are many measures of the size of a business. A few
examples might be sales, numbers of employees, income generated,
assets, and net worth. Of these, there have been many subdivi-
sions such as net capital assets, numbers of research workers,
primary sales not including vertical integration, and income re-
turned to business as opposed to total income. Adelman in his
"Measurement of Industrial Concentration," uses sales, employees,
income, and assets. On the other hand the Federal Trade Commission
M. A. Adelman, "The Measurement of Industrial Concentra-
tion," The Review of Economics and Statistics , Vol. XXXIII (No-
vember 1951)* PP. 270 ff.
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in its "Report on the Concentration of Productive Facilities ,
"
used primarily the measure of net capital assets. Adelman dis-
misses the FTC report with the comment that "the percentage of net
capital assets is the best measure of concentration if and only if
2
one wishes to maximize the probable error of estimate.
Sales as a Measure of Size
The measurement of industrial size is very often based on
the criterion of sales, as that is the most readily available fig-
ure among business enterprises. It is not, however, considered
the best measure because it disregards the amount of fixed assets
required to generate such sales, the extent of vertical integra-
tion, and the costs incident to distribution which make such sales
possible.
Employees as a Measure of Size
The advantage of such a measure is that price levels,
changes in products, or productivity changes of employees do not
have to be considered in statistical calculations. It is the one
non-monetary measure of concentration. The advantage of this
criterion is that while a company might double its sales, if such
doubling came about by the increased productivity of the workers
and had no significance to investment, or external growth factors,
it would be hard to say that the company has doubled in size, as
would be "proven" under the sales method.
Federal Trade Commission, "Report on the Concentration of
Productive Facilities," as cited by Adelman, ibid. , p. 273.
p
Adelman, op. cit. , p. 274.
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Income as a Measure of Size
It would appear that Income might be the best single meas-
ure of economic size of a firm. Seldom, however, is the true in-
come known. The financial statements issued by firms have been
refined to such a point that disclosure of this item has been well
covered. There is little likelihood that corporations will be any
more willing to pass such information along in the future.
Rate of return on net worth has been used as a measure of
size and concentration. However, an examination of rates of re-
turn indicates that the larger the company the smaller the rate
of return on the average.
Assets as a Measure of Size
The problem of dealing with assets becomes even more
clouded than that with income. Income might be used as profits
after taxes and at least a definable figure could be arrived at,
though the "profits" be indeterminable. In the case of assets,
however, it brings about statistical problems that are almost in-
surmountable. Were the assets purchased at present prices? Were
they purchased twenty years ago and are now worth considerably
more than shown on the books? Has a company assets that have been
fully depreciated and not shown, yet worth a great deal on today's
market? Do some carry trademarks, leases, goodwill, etc., at a
nominal figure of one dollar, while others put millions into their
statements covering these items? The definition of assets becomes
^Joseph L. McConnell, "19^2 Corporate Profits by Size of
Firms," Survey of Current Business , January, 1946, Table 5.
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a definition of accounting theory
J
Size or Numbers
In the consideration of the measurement of industrial con-
centration the question of numbers of mergers continually enters
the discussions. Whether numbers is a proper measure is question-
able, Lintner and Butters in their study of the problem state:
For the most part the apparent contradiction between
many of our findings and those of the Commission is ex-
plained by the fact that the Commission analyzed primarily
data on the number of mergers, whereas our analysis also
takes full account of the size of the merged companies. 1
Relative Growth vs Absolute Growth
In addition to the problem of direct measurement of size
there enters the problem of measurement in relative growth or ab-
solute growth. The authors of the previously mentioned Lintner
and Butters study of the "Effect of Mergers on Industrial Concen-
tration," were accused by John Blair and Harrison Houghton of
"statistical biases" and with having a "joker" in their analysis
when they measured concentration by relative size rather than ab-
solute size. By using absolute size Blair and Houghton "reversed"
the Lintner Butters findings. They explained, "Hence, in terms of
both number and assets, the absolute growth of large business re-
sulting from mergers was clearly greater than that of small busi-
ness."
2
John Lintner and J. Keith Butters, "Effects of Mergers on
Industrial Concentration, 19^0-19^7*" Review of Economics and
Statistics , Vol. XXXI, No. I, February 1950, p. 31.
o
John M. Blair and Harrison F. Houghton, "The Lintner-
Butters Analysis of the Effect of Mergers on Industrial Concentra-
tion," Review of Economics and Statistics , Vol. XXXIII, No. I,
February, 1951 > p. 64.
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Lintner and Butters dismissed this comment by saying,
Drs. Blair and Houghton simply ignored our detailed treat-
ment. . . . ratios on which their "revised figures" and chart
are based, and from which they draw conclusions contrary to
ours are fallacious in,their construction and hence misleading
in their implications.
Measurement by Concentration Ratios
Once a method of "measurement" has been determined, the
procedure for obtaining concentration ratios within industries is
quite standard with writers as well as with the Department of
Commerce and the FTC.
These concentration ratios are obtained by dividing the
assets, (or other dimensions of size decided upon) of the largest
four sellers within an industry by the total sales for the industry.
If an industry is significant for its high degree of con-
centration perhaps the largest three concerns (or in some cases
two concerns) are used as the measure of concentration.
By the use of these concentration ratios the extent of
oligopoly can be Indicated, but regardless of the degree of this
oligopoly it will measure the relative size of the largest units
in relation to the total. Changes in industry ratios can be com-
pared with other industries to note trends either towards or away
from further concentration.
Is Concentration of Industry Increasing?
According to the Federal Trade Commission, which is charged
with the knowledge of what is happening to business by way of
John Lintner and J. Keith Butters, "Rejoinder to Drs.
Blair and Houghton," Review of Economics and Statistics , Vol.




mergers, concentration of industry, as a result of mergers, is in-
creasing at a rate that is threatening the free enterprise system.
No great stretch of the imagination is required to foresee
that if nothing is done to check the growth in concentration,
either the giant corporations will ultimately take over the
country, or the government will be impelled to step in and im-
pose some form of direct regulation in the public interest.
In either event, collectivism will have triumphed over free
enterprise, and the theory of competition will have been rele-
gated to the limbo of well-intentioned but ineffective ideals.
This is a warning which the Commission has repeated time and
again, and one which some of those who have the most to gain
by the preservation of competition seem determined to ignore.
The Commission believes that the economic forces, on which
it has been basing its warnings, require that a definite choice
be made. Either this country is going down the road to col-
lectivism or it must stand and fight for competition as the
protector of all that is embodied in free enterprise.
Crucial in that fight must be some effective means of
preventing giant corporations from steadily increasing their
power at the expense of small business. 1
It is evident that the nature of the comments contained in
the above was the signal that set off the great number of articles $
comments, rejoinders, and rebuttals that have appeared through the
years since its publishing. The economists and businessmen have
set out to prove or disprove the "facts."
One of the first such studies was made by Celeste Stokes
in November of 19^7* and it was reported that the growth of assets
of the largest 200 manufacturing concerns had been compared with
that of 800 other corporations of medium to large size. For the
period 1939-19^6 the former group increased assets by 4l# and the
latter group by 1Q2#. The sampling technique in the selection of
Federal Trade Commission, The Merger Movement: A Summary
Report , op. cit. , p. 17.
p
K. Celeste Stokes, "Financial Trends of Large Manufactur-
ing Corporations, ' Survey of Current Business, November 19^7, as
cited by Adelman, op. cit. , p. 283.
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the 800 concerns has since been challenged and other statistics
of the report questioned.
As previously mentioned, Lintner and Butters completed a
study on the effects of mergers on industrial concentration for
the period 1940-1947. Their findings were reported in an article
by that name in 1950. The results of the findings were to "essen-
tially reverse the PTC" and that "as a result of mergers , small
business made greater gains than large business."
Coal was added to the fire by the Attorney General in a
report to congress during 1950. Apparently using the basic think-
ing of the FTC, he said:
• . . during the last war the long standing tendency
toward economic concentration was accelerated. . . . Since
increased concentration is regarded as undesirable, it is
considered necessary to counteract it even if this means
that the government will have to pay higher prices for
defense supplies ... or accept non-combat items of less
reliable quality. 2
This report by the Attorney General made it appear that
increased concentration was a proven fact and that such drastic
action as the procurement of inferior goods at higher prices
should result. This "proven fact" was also the result of a report
of the Smaller War Plants Corporation who made a study, at the
direction of the 79th Congress, entitled "Economic Concentration
and world War II. "^ This report made no mention of any statistics
Lintner and Butters, op. cit. , p. 31.
p
Letter of transmittal attached to the Report of the
Attorney General of the United States prepared pursuant to Section
708 (e) of the Defense Act of 1950, pp. 4-39-36.
Smaller War Plants Corporation, "Economic Concentration
and World War II," Report to 79th Congress, 2d Sess., Senate




or writings that had endeavored to prove that increased concentra-
tion had not taken place during the period. It appeared so biased
in its approach that little came of the work of the committee. Of
this, Adelman remarked "The authors of the SWPC report had the op-
portunity to make a real contribution in a field Important both in
peace and war. Unfortunately, their data are simply Irrelevant."
He added that, "There is every reason to urge that public policy
be made on the basis of fact rather than warmed-over fiction."
In 1951 $ Blair and Houghton made their reply to the Lint-
ner and Butters analysis of concentration. They say of the work
that, "If Lintner and Butters statistical procedure is carried to
its logical conclusions, absurd results are reached." Thus they
not only disagreed with the findings but with the statistical
measurement and procedures as well. In defense of the FTC posi-
tion, of which they were the foremost supporters they then went
on to remark;
Indeed if the Commission had made any general statement
on this point, it would probably have concluded, based on its
own data, that the recent merger movement had not "substanti-
ally" increased concentration in manufacturing as a whole.
In a "Rejoinder" to the Blair-Houghton analysis of their
work, Lintner and Butters were quick to take to task the authors
for their comments. They were happy, they said, to note that
finally the FTC agreed with them that substantial increases in
concentration hadn*t taken place but if this were the case, why
had the FTC made dire predictions and warnings of such an event.
Adelman, op. cit. , p. 284.
p
Blair and Houghton, op. cit.





In any event, in direct contrast to the erroneous ratios com-
puted by Drs. Blair and Houghton, the corrected ratios defi-
nitely would show a larger growth by all 'small" companies
from mergers than by all companies with assets over $10
million.
J. Fred Weston, prior to the publishing of his book on
The Role of Mergers in the Growth of Large Firms , entered the con-
troversy, took exception to some of the Lintner-Butters statistics,
and defended a good part of the Blair-Houghton writings. His con-
clusions were considerably more guarded, however, and he said:
(1) During 19^0^7 small firms were acquired to an extent
neither greater nor less than their relative numbers in the
business population.
(2) When measured by numbers of acquisitions or the abso-
lute amount of assets acquired, the largest firms were rela-
tively more important acquirers than smaller firms. When
measured by the percentage of increase in assets secured
through acquisitions, small firms grew to a greater extent
by merger than large firms. Neither measure yields conclusive
evidence on the nature of extent of concentration associated
with merger activity during the period. 2
Perhaps Weston's greatest contribution at this time was
pouring oil on the troubled waters by pointing out that there are
elements of arbitrariness in any measure of concentration and that
such measures should be selected carefully to assure that they are
appropriate for guidance in the problem at hand.
In a "Rejoinder to Dr. Weston," Lintner and Butters dis-
missed his criticism ty saying that either he didn't read their
1John Lintner and J. Keith Butters, "Rejoinder to Drs.
Blair and Houghton," Review of Economics and Statistics , Vol.
XXXIII, No. 1, February 1951* p. 6b.
J. Fred Weston, "Comments on Lintner-Butters Analysis,"




article or, if he did, he didn't understand it.
It is most interesting to note that three years later, on
the publishing of his book, Weston's position had veered to a
strong one in opposition to the Blair-Houghton-FTC findings. He
now says that "The evidence 13 consistent and persuasive,. . . .
The recent merger movement appears not to have accentuated the
level of industrial concentration significantly.
"
2 In another
portion of his book, he comments:
... the data on changes in absolute concentration afford
a basis for general agreement that the merger movement of
1940-47 did not substantially increase industrial concentra-
tion, either over all or in more than two or three product
lines.
^
In November of 1951* Adelman published his work on "The
Measurement of Industrial Concentration, " which has been commented
on so often in this thesis. His conclusions were:
l) The American economy is highly concentrated.
(
2j Concentration is highly uneven.
,3; The extent of concentration shows no tendency to
grow, and it may possibly be declining. Any tendency
either way, if it does exist, must be at the pace of
a glacial drift. 4
Adelman continues, in commenting on the assets of the 139
largest firms, (although his statistics are cautious) that "The
data shows a reduction of nearly 10 per cent in the share held by
the largest 139." His conclusion is without reservation: "It is
John Lintner and J. Keith Butters, "Rejoinder to Dr.
Weston," Review of Economics and Statistics , Vol. XXXIII, No. 1,
February 1951* p. 73.
p
J. Fred Weston, The Role of Mergers in the Growth of
Lar^e i«'irms , (Eerkeley and Los Angeles : University of California
Press, 1953)* p. 58.
3Ibld. , p. 55.
Adelman, op. cit. , p. 295.
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also a statement of fact, there has been no increase in concentra-
tion. . . m1
The proponents of increased concentration were not long
in attacking Adelman's article, his statistics, his procedures,
and hi? findings. George Stocking was cryptic in his comments:
Professor Adelman is looking at the forest, hence he does not
see the trees. Some of the trees have grown pretty big. . . .
Recent mergers in the textile field, for example, have gone
far enough to change the structure of the industry. 2
Weston had warned of the increase of concentration in the
textile field:
Poods and textiles were the only broad industry groups in
which marked increases in concentration took place during the
merger movement of 1940-47.3
It was strange to hear one of the strongest opponents of
big business, George Stigler, reverse Weston's and Stocking's
findings in his comment: "Some of our biggest industries, such
as textiles, shoes, and most food industries will require no anti-
nit
trust action.
Jesse W. Markham was another writer who did not agree that
integration in the textile industry had gone far enough to affect
market behavior.
^Adelman, ibid. , pp. 289-295.
George W. Stocking, "Four Comments on The Measurement of
Industrial Concentration, " Review of Economics and Statistics ,
Vol. XXXIV, No. II, May 1952, p. 167.
-'Weston, op. cit.
, p. 58.
Stigler, "The Case Against Big Business," op. cit. , p. 16£
^Jesse W. Markham, "Integration in the Textile Industry,"
Harvard Business Review , Vol. XXXVIII, January 1950, pp. 74-88.
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Corwin D. Edwards went further than Stocking with his com-
ments concerning Adelman's work. He defended the Attorney General's
report as well as the reports of the FTC but stated that the PTC
made no attempt to measure the over-all trend of concentration
during World War II.
The words concerning increasing concentration (in the re-
ports) are designed merely to record that the purpose of the
reports is to help prevent undue concentration of economic
power by pointing out conditions that tend to envoke it.l
The above quotation by Edwards is all the more important
as it was made in his capacity as Director of the Bureau of Eco-
nomics in the Federal Trade Commission. The Commission had warned
that "either the giant corporations will ultimately take over the
country, or the government will be impelled to step in and impose
some form of direct regulation in the public interest," and that
"The importance of external expansion in promoting concentration
has never been more clearly revealed than in the acquisition move-
ment that is taking place at the present time."2 These statements
should now be re-evaluated.
Edwards' article went on to defend the use of "net capital
assets" as a measure of concentration and took issue with Adelman's
question of its correctness. He added that "it merely presents on$
measure of concentration at one level of business organization for
one period of time." This should have been enough to discredit
Corwin D. Edwards, "Four Comments on The Measurement of
Industrial Concentration, Review of Economics and Statistics ,
Vol. XXXIV, No. II, May 1952, p. 158.
p
Federal Trade Commission, The Merger Movement: A Summary
Report 3 op. cit. , pp. 4-7.
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the FTC report, but Edwards continued:
The Commission's report was concerned primarily with the
levels of concentration in 26 manufacturing industries and
only incidentally with manufacturing as a whole
.
It has been previously pointed out that Blair and Houghton,
economists at the FTC, while challenging all prooonents of "no in-
creased concentration" finally backed down to admit that the FTC
didn't mean that concentration had been "substantially Increased."
Now the Director of the Economic Bureau states that their report
was designed merely to help prevent undue concentration by point-
ing out conditions that tend to evoke it, that it used only one
method of measurement, and that it was only concerned Incidentally
with manufacturing as a whole.1
Stocking continues his criticism of Adelman f s work by say-
ing that "Even Professor Adelman seems surer of his results in
criticizing the Commission's findings than in analyzing his own
statistical data. " In commenting on the people who might use
Adelman 1 s work, he expressed the following opinion:
It is to be hoped that they will not recklessly use
Professor Adelman 1 s cautiously worded findings as a cloak
to conceal a program to discredit an agency now required
by law to determine whether specific mergers do in fact
tend to substantially lessen competition or create a
monopoly. 2
Adelman disposes of his critics by saying:
It is not clear that Messrs. Stocking and Edwards agree
or disagree.
. . . Mr. Edwards' criticisms are invalid, but
even if they were valid they would be quantitatively unimpor-
tant and would in no case change the indicated tendency. j
Edwards, op. cit. , pp. 1^9* ioO.
o
Stocking, op. cit. , p. 168.
•%. A. Adelman, "Rejoinder," Review of Economics and
Statistics , Vol. XXXIV, No. II, May 1952, p. 174.
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Edwin B. Qeorge defends Adelraan's work to a considerable
degree and therefore lends credence to it. George's opinions are
expressed as follows:
Primarily, however, it reflects my views that his constructive
presentation, itself, is in general excellent and so far as I
know not open to serious criticism at vital points.
A. A. Berle Jr. is another writer of considerable stature
who came to the defense of Adelman. He says "Adelman's able sta-
tistical review is a refreshing dose of fact in a welter of con-
troversy.
In November of 1952, Blair again took up the challenge of
his critics and replied to Adelman's work, much in the same fash-
ion as he did with the Lintner-Butters findings. His comments
began in a note of agreement with some of the findings. He then
proceeded to defend the SWPC report and explain in technical sta-
tistical detail his objections to the Adelman findings.-* He added
a contribution to the conflict in opinions by once again bringing
emphasis on the task of measuring concentration.
Most of the shortcomings of the concentration measures de-
veloped in the past have stemmed from (a) the fact that the
basic data used have been collected frequently for different
purposes, and (b) the lack of resources to adjust, correct,
and interpret these admittedly imperfect bodies of data.
Under such circumstances it is almost inevitable that differ-
Edwin B. George, "Four Comments on The Measurement of
Industrial Concentration, " Review of Economics and Statistics
Vol. XXXIV, No. II, May 1952, p. 168.
*~A. A. Berle, Jr., 'Four Comments on the Measurement of
Industrial Concentration, Review of Economics and Statistics
Vol. XXXIV, No. II, May 1952, p. 172.
o
^John M. Blair, "The Measurement of Industrial Concentra-
tion, A Reply," Review of Economics and Statistics , Vol. XXXIV,
No. IV, November 1952, pp. 343-355.

139
ences among economists will arise as to the validity of spe-
cific measures and the appropriateness of the accompanying
analysis.*
After a rather comprehensive analysis of the over-all
problem and comment on his disagreement with Adelman that concen-
tration had possibly decreased , he concludes:
Finally it is questionable whether his frequent indulgence in
argumentum ad hominem (as in likening his opponents to "scurvy
politicians ) constitutes any significant contribution to
knowledge in this admittedly difficult field of economic
analysis.
At this point Adelman, in a further "Rejoinder, " commented
on Blair's article as follows:
Mr, Elair will nowhere assert that concentration increased
during World War II or increased through mergers during 1940-
kj. The issue of fact, then, is no longer in dispute - there
is no evidence of increasing concentration. . . .
In point of fact, I went to some pains to avoid mentioning
Mr. Blair's name, and for reasons indicated in the next para-
graph, I now regret the avoidance.
Dr. Blair's article is void of facts or correct analysis,
but it serves a highly useful purpose. ... In the future,
having fixed responsibility for particular reports, we will be
better able to appraise the commission's out put.
3
While these are harsh words put out by Adelman, he has con
siderable support in his findings and beliefs. In this particular
instance Lintner and Butters came to his defense and in a "Further
Rejoinder" took Blair to task:
He is now in a position where - in order to defend spuri-
ous "conclusions" regarding the relative Importance of mergers
to different size classes of firms - he himself is going to
1ILid. , p. 3^3.
2Ibid. , p. 335.
-^M. A. Adelman, "Rejoinder," Review of Economics and Sta-
tistics , Vol. XXXIV, No. IV, November 1952, pp. 356, 363.
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extreme lengths to deflate the importance of the recent merger
movement .
*
In reference to Adelraan's latest charge against him and
the position of the FTC, Dr. Blair indicated that Adelman f s work
was obnoxious, outrageous, and not worthy of further comment;
The year 1954 brought the publication of the FTC's Changes
in Concentration in Manufacturing 1935 to 194-7 and 1950 . Results
of those studies indicate that they had found that concentration
during the period under study increased a maximum of 2.8 percent-
age points within the largest 200 firms (see Table II and Figure
3). Such an increase does not appear to be alarming over a fifteen
year period, however the Commission does point out that changes in
concentration in certain fields such as the food, beverage and to-
bacco industries, has considerably exceeded the average. It is
doubtful that this report, as important as it is, will do much to
settle the dispute. First the FTC points emphasis on the indi-
vidual industries and discounts the importance of the average in-
crease in rate of 2.8 percentage points, while its critics point
to the average rate and note the fact that the Commission states
that their figures are only accurate to 2 percentage points. The
John LIntner and J. Keith Butters, "Further Rejoinder,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. XXXIV, No. IV, November
1952, p. 367.
%)Iscussions with John M. Blair, personal interviews,
Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C., December 1954, and
March 1955.
-^Federal Trade Commission, Changes in Concentration in
Manufacturing 1935 to 1947 and 1950, (Washington: Government
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critics only have to turn to the report itself for defense of their
position.
The Commission says of its work, "Because of the fact that
the 1950 data were obtained through a sample survey, rather than
through a complete canvass, the figures for a number of industries
in the 1935-50 comparisons are in the nature of estimates." In
another part of the report, the Commission state "In the case of a
number of industries for which the Census Bureau published no fig-
ures on value of product, it was necessary to prepare special es-
timates." The report commences with a full chapter devoted to
cautioning the reader on the incompleteness of the statistics
used.
^
Effect of Mergers on Industrial Concentration
The subject being investigated in this chapter is con-
cerned more with the effect of mergers on industrial concentration
than on concentration, itself. As previously pointed out, to ar-
rive at any proper conclusions the subject of measurement and con-
centration had to be explored. It stands to reason that if there
has been no increase in concentration of industry during the past
fifteen years then certainly mergers could not be condemned on that
score. On the other hand, if there had been considerable increase
in concentration, and it could be found that mergers were largely





3Ibid. , Chapter I.
.
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might well be in order.
Not unlike the controversy on concentration, itself, the
effect of mergers on such concentration is no less disputed. Adel-
man's position, more or less concurred in by Weston, Lintner,
Butters, George, and Berle, is:
Whatever the effects of mergers, they were swamped, and
submerged by other forms of growth. A generous estimate is
that not over $5 billion was involved in all manufacturing
and mining during 1940-47. But during the period according
to a source which is biased downward, the total assets of all
corporations in these fields increased from $67.8 billion to
$llo.6 billion; the increase was over ten times the amount in-
volved in mergers. 1
Edwards, as Director of the Economic Bureau of the FTC,
might well be speaking for Blair, Houghton, and Stocking, when he
refutes Adelman:
Apparently, Mr. Adelman, like Lintner and Butters, regards
the effect of corporate mergers as negligible partly on the
ground that it was overshadowed by other factors such as the
reinvestment of corporate earnings. To take this position is
to deny that there is a significant difference in kind between
a reshuffling of sizes which leaves the corporate entities in
existence, on the one hand, and the permanent disappearance
of corporate entities, on the other. 2
It appears that the FTC might be able to prove that merg-
ers had accounted for increases in concentration in certain in-
dustries, but it likewise appears unlikely that any great over-all
increase could be proved such as their original "Merger Movement"
report indicated. In reference to the burden of such proofs,
George comments that "Economists sponsoring the new approach have
a strong obligation to come down to cases. The burden should not
Adelman, "The Measurement of Industrial Concentration,"
op. cit. , p. 294.
Edwards, "Four Comments on The Measurement of Industrial
Concentration," op. cit. , p. 159.
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all be on the proponents of workable competition.
"
Summary
From the evidence submitted it would appear that the orig-
inal charges by the FTC were more a "cry of wolf" than a factual,
documented reports about substantial increases in concentration as
a result of the recent merger movement. Although the economists
from the FTC go to great lengths to refute Adelman, Lintner-
Butters, and others, by their comments it appears that they back-
track considerably from their original position. In a defense of
the FTC position Stocking used the following words which seemed to
further weaken the FTC case and discredit the agency charged by
law to control business:
The democratic way of life permits pressure groups both
within and without the government to resort to propaganda in
an effort to modify statutes. 2
Taken literally, this could only mean that Stocking is
suggesting that perhaps some of the FTC report was propaganda.
Which part, would be the first question? Much of the reading
public might conclude that if some of it was propaganda, then per-
haps all of it was. Such procedures, if in fact used, by an agency
of the government are questionable!
After an examination of the evidence, Adelman 1 s comment
which prefaced this chapter can best be used to sum up the find-
ings on concentration: "Concentration may be a problem, but, for
better or worse, it is not threatening to engulf the economy."
George, op. cit. , p. 1/1.
Stocking, op. cit. , p. 168.
.
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Moreover, it should be added, that mergers as a cause of Increased
concentration may have had some effect in selected industries but
negligible effect in industry as a whole.

CHAPTER VI
THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT,
THE BUSINESSMAN, AND PUBLIC POLICY
"There i3 sound logic to the development of public policy
against restraints of trade, but it is a logic that has
its limits; and the ends sought must be considered in re-
lation to other social goals and to the practical realities
of economic life." Bowman and Bach, Economic Analysis and
Public Policy , p. 82.
The previous chapters have dealt with specific problems in
relation to the nature and significance of industrial mergers.
While continuing reference was made to the positions of govern-
ment, business, and the public, no critical analysis of these
segments of the economy was given. It is the purpose of this
chapter to discuss them in more detail so that a better under-
standing of much of the controversy over the subject of mergers
may be obtained.
Government Operations and Mergers
An examination of the wealth of writings on the pros and
cons of government agencies and the Congress in relation to their
work on monopoly and competition makes fascinating reading. The
results of such study are no less interesting.
In the government of the United States there are three
areas of power. These are the Legislative Branch, the Judicial
Branch, and the Executive Branch. Each is represented in the con-
trol of mergers. The Congress legislates the laws, the courts




Each has come in for its share of praise or criticism, as the case
may be. However, the Department of Justice has been so free from
criticism in this area that for the purpose of this thesis it is
concluded that this agency generally has the respect of business,
the Congress and the courts.
The position of the courts was well described under the
Law of Mergers. That they have problems in understanding and
matching the laws with the interpretations of the Federal Trade
Commission is obvious. Justice Jackson indicated his views on
this matter in the following statement:
I have difficulty in knowing where we are with this, and
I should think the people who are trying to do business
would find it much more troublesome than we do, for it
does not trouble me but once a terra, but it must trouble
them every day. 1
The two areas of most conflict appear to be in the making
of the laws by the Congress and the administration of those laws
by the Federal Trade Commission. The Congress is blamed by busi-
ness, the FTC, and the courts for not making the laws clear in
intent. Thomas Cristopher says that the phrase, "restraint of
trade," and the statement, "unfair methods of competition in com-
merce, and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are
hereby declared unlawful," are about as definite as "Sin is hereby
declared unlawful." He asks, "Murder is murder but what is unfair
competition?" On the other hand, there are many^ who believe
Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. FTC, 3^0 US, 231 (1951).
^Thomas W. Christopher, "Use and Misuse of Authority by
Federal Agencies," Harvard Business Review , Vol. XXX, No. 6,
November December 1952, p. 48.
JSee for example, Stigler, op. cit. , p. 164.

149
that it would not only be unwise but impossible to spell out all
forms of prohibitive action for business. Yet the present lan-
guage appears impossible I Justice Brandeis once observed , "Every
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains."
The laws concerning mergers undoubtedly ha»^ ;o be broad
in scope. If every prohibitive act was spelled out by legislation
then each new act of business that was challenged would have to go
through the process of legislation before it was found to be legal
or illegal. In addition, the statutes setting up agencies such as
the FTC also, undoubtedly, have to be as broad in scope, leaving
direct application of the laws to the discretion of the Commission
itself.
The problem then resolves itself to one of giving neces-
sary authority to an agency to carry out the desired and required
ends without that authority being used in illegal and improper
ways. Thus the emphasis in this section will be on the Federal
Trade Commission and how it has been considered in relationship
to those ends.
The Case Against the Federal Trade Commission
The charges against the FTC are many and varied but gen-
erally fall into broad categories of: (l) not carrying out the
purpose intended of the Commission, (2) adding to the confusion
of the antitrust laws by refusing information, conflicting state-
ments, and acting contrary to the laws as laid down by Congress,
(3) acting arbitrarily and expounding private economic views,
P. 115.
iuA Businesslike Antitrust Policy,'' Fortune , November 1953,
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(4) Inefficient operation, and (5) hostility to business.
One of the most condemning articles concerning the Com-
mission appeared in the University of Chicago Law Review by-
William Simon, in 1952. Considerable support has been found for
p
his views.
President Woodrow Wilson, in setting up the framework for
the Federal Trade Commission, stated its purpose to be "only as an
indispensable instrument of information and publicity. "^ He went
on to discuss its function as one of informing businesses of the
requirements of the laws.
A Senate Subcommittee which had been appointed in 1950 to
inquire into the extent to which the Commission clarified the law
on the subject of freight absorption, had this to say concerning
its purpose:
The Commission does not consider itself a body such as
that envisioned by President Wilson. In the hearings before
this subcommittee, the Commission has taken the position that
it cannot indicate, in advance of specific litigation before
it, the rules of law applicable to business in interstate
commerce.*
The Hoover Commission went further in exploring the carry-
ing out of this "purpose of the commission" and said
:
Over the years, the Commission has engaged mainly in activi-
ties contributing little toward accomplishing the primary
William Simon, "The Case Against the Federal Trade Com-
mission," University of Chicago Law Review , Vol. 19, Winter 1952.
2
Author's note: Simon's article is heavily documented and
much credit is given to his documentation here, however, most of
his sources were examined to expand on his thoughts.
^President Woodrow Wilson, Message to Congress, January 20,
1914, as cited by Simon, op. cit. , p. 299.
Senate Report No. 2627* 8lst Cong., 2d Sess., p. 5 (1950)
as cited by Simon, ibid. , p. 299.
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Congressional objectives of assuring widespread effective
competition. 1
Failure to receive information from the Commission is a
complaint running throughout the critics' writings. The Hoover
Commission commented, "in a field of such public interest, the
Commission has a duty to be truly informative, concerning its own
standards and policies.
It is only after litigation has been started and a com-
plaint issued that the businessman can be aware of the Commission's
charge. Cristopher says:
When a man is sued for a million dollars in a civil suit, he
expects a number of things of the court. He expects to be
informed of the exact complaints. He expects an orderly pro-
ceeding. He assumes that the judge will not act for the
plaintiff.
3
With proceedings before the Commission the defendants have
little or none of the above assurances. Simon attacks the Com-
mission on this point also:
The Commission's failure to be informative, and its refusal
to admit publicly the statutory construction which it advo-
cates in the courts, appears to be the result of its, or at
least some of its, staff's desire to achieve a judicial con-
struction of the statutes in accord with their economic
ideologies, without the public being aware of the effect on
our economy of those constructions.'
A Senate Subcommittee was very direct in commenting on
the problem of information either given or not given by the
TThe Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions ,
(Washington: (Jovernraent Printing Office, 1949 j, p. 122.
2Ibid. , p. 131.
^Cristopher, op. clt. , p. 53«
^Simon, op. cit. j p. 300.
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Commission. It reported "much of this confusion - conceded by
everyone to exist - is directly attributable to the Federal Trade
Commission.
"
In reference to Simon's charge that the staff of the PTC
2
put forth their own economic ideologies it was at first strange
to find that Lowell B. Mason, a Commissioner of the FTC, agreed.
It was even stranger to find that several of the Commissioners
not only agreed with the critics of the FTC, but in some cases
went further, as will be indicated later. Commissioner Mason com-
mented on the economic views as follows:
It was a natural consequence of a decline in administra-
tive leadership by the Commissioners. Into a vacuum it was
natural and necessary for the staff to step into leadership.
The Commission became the trial ground for new theories of
industrial control sponsored by men of personal integrity,
ability and vigor. . . . The point is made that when de-
cisions are abandoned to those without responsible authority,
an agency, like a society, declines in its effectiveness even
though it appears to increase its powers.
3
Although Mason upheld the "integrity, ability and vigor' 1
of the staff that expounded these economic theories, others were
not as kind to them. The Hoover Commission notes "With notable
exceptions, appointments to the FTC have been made with too little
interest in the skills and experience pertinent to the problems
of competition and monopoly ... Representative Patman, a
proponent of the FTC, was chairman of the Patman Small Business
Senate Report No. 2627* op. cit. , p. 11.
2Simon, op. cit. , p. 297.
-'Lowell B. Mason, Paper presented before the New York Bar
Association, New York City, January 2k, 1951. Mlmeo. report.
|The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, op. cit. , p. 125.
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Committee which characterized the Commission as a "palace of in-
ternal strife and office politics."1
The policies of the FTC often appear totally irresponsible*
Speaking on the broader policy issues, Edward Mason notes that
"anti-trust policy has not been consistent. Large firms with
great power have been left immune while associates with less power
have been broken up.
"
On the day to day issues the policies of the Commission
on "basing-point" pricing is a case in point. The Commission had
advocated against basing-point pricing for over fifteen years,
and , in 1948, the Supreme Court issued a sweeping affirmation of
the Commission's findings and ruled that the basing-point system
was collusive price-fixing which was in violation of the antitrust
acts.-1
Since that time the Commission dropped the American Iron
and Steel Institute case dealing with the same problem and com-
mented, "The Commission is not acting to prohibit or interfere
with delivered pricing or freight asorption as such ...
The Senate Sub-Committee studying the problem reported:
For almost 3 years businessmen have been terribly con-
fused as to whether they can lawfully absorb. Much of this
confusion ... is directly attributable to the Federal Trade
Commission. It must accept responsibility for the adverse
House Report No. 3236, 8lst Cong., 2d Sess., p. 16 (1951
)
Edward S. Mason, "Schumpeter on Monopoly and the Large
Firm, " Review of Economics and Statistics , Vol. XXXIII, February
1951, p. 140.
•^Federal Trade Commission, The Merger Movement : A Summary
Report , op. clt. , p. 2.
^FTC Docket #5508, 1951.
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effects on our economy in this confusion.
Even after careful study of those lengthy answers (by
the Commission) we are still unable to determine when and
under what circumstances the FTC regards freight absorption
as constituting an injury to competition. 1
The Senate Committee went further:
Even at the painful expense of a slight loss of face, it
would be far preferable for the Commission to admit that it
has reversed its position than to compel businessmen to specu-
late on whether to accept what the Commission now says unof-
fically or what it previously argued in litigated cases. 2
It has often been charged that the Commission, in fact, is
against competition and takes steps to restrict it. In their cease
and desist order against Standard Oil Company of Indiana, they re-
quired that company to "discontinue selling to any wholesaler who
resold below the price which it charged to its retailers.""^
Had Standard Oil complied with this order it would have
been Indicted by the Attorney General under the Sherman Act for
"conspiracy to fix prices." Justice Jackson wrote of this, "
. .
what troubles me - the whole philosophy of the Sherman Antitrust
Act is to go out and compete, get business, fight for it. Now,
the whole philosophy we are asked to enforce here (under the
Robinson-Patraan Act) is that you really must not." The court in
reversing the Commission stated that the Congress had not intended
"either to abolish competition or . . . radically to curtail it."
as the Commission's order had done.
Senate Report No. 2027* op. cit. , pp. 6, 7, 11.
2Ibld. , p. 9.
^Order dated August 9, 19^6 in FTC Docket No. 4389.
^Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. FTC, 3^0 US. 231 (1951).
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While the above comments have little to do with merger
cases handled by the FTC, it is pertinent to note that this is
part of the criticism by the Hoover commission, mentioned previ-
ously, that the Commission "has engaged mainly in activities con-
tributing little toward accomplishing the primary Congressional
objectives of assuring widespread effective competition." The
Staff Report to the Monopoly Subcommittee of the Select House Com-
mittee on Small Business said, "The campaign to which the Commis-
sion has pointed with greatest pride was not beneficial to anyone,
and least of all to small business."
The hostile climate that business finds itself in at the
Commission is not to its credit. Edward Mason puts this very
clearly:
One of the conclusions deriving from these political con-
sequences is the improbability of shaping through current
democratic processes, a public policy toward the large firm
in particular, and business practice in general, that will
give due consideration to efficiency and to conditions con-
ducive to progress in efficiency. Much more likely is a
policy of vindictive business harassment.3
Simon sums up his attitude toward the Federal Trade Com-
mission as follows:
The concensus of informed people — including committees
of both houses of Congress -- is that the Federal Trade Com-
mission has utterly failed in its intended purpose. The
record of its accomplishments, including its own public state-
ments, show that it has inflicted substantial injury on our
way of business life. This failure of the Commission in its
The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, op. cit. , p. 122.
2,Staff Report to the Monopoly Subcommittee of the Select
House Committee on Small Business, 79th Congress, 2d Sess., p. 33
(19^6).
^Edward S. Mason, op. cit. , p. 144.
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statutory mission is due largely to its staff, the "unortho-
dox" ideologies for which they have crusaded, and their un-1
willingness to enforce the laws as promulgated by Congress.
The fact that William Simon has represented business
against many of the cases brought by the PTC, and that he has been
a lobbyist for many of the principles for which business has fought,
makes for considerable knowledge of the operations of the Commis-
sion; it no less makes such a condemnation of the Commission some-
what suspect. However, Simon has the backing of many of the Com-
missioners, themselves.
James Landis, former Dean of the Harvard Law School, for-
mer Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission, former Commis-
sioner of the Security and Exchange Commission, and former Clerk
to Justice Brandeis of the Supreme Court, had this to say of his
former charges
:
. . . reference must be made to what I would call the utter
bankruptcy of the Federal Trade Commission. As a practical
matter the deterioration of that Commission has gone beyond
the possibility of redemption. If duties of this kind are
to be thrust on some agency, there is really only one thing
to do, and that is to wipe out the FTC completely and start
afresh. 2
Commissioner Landis was not alone in the condemnation of
the FTC. Lowell B. Mason, a present commissioner, who was previ-
ously quoted, stated:
We lost the confidence of industry. We were reviled and be-
rated by House and Senate. We allowed our staff to roam the
halls of Congress, spreading discord, discontent and disre-
spect for our vain pretentions.
Clyde Reed, • . • once characterized the Commission as
Simon, op. cit., p. 297.
p
James M. Landis, as cited in George W. Stocking, Monopoly





having dried up and blown away, an entirely unfair and inac-
curate description of us because as a matter of fact, we have
not blown away.
Commissioner Spingain was not quite as convinced as his
colleagues, but he added:
Frankly, I could not say that the Commission has been a
howling success in that respect (suppressing practices lead-
ing to monopoly, unfair competition and deception) neither,
I think, has it been a failure. Some people say it has. The
truth is probably somewhere in between. 2
To the continual claim by the Commission that it is ham-
pered by shortages of funds and personnel, the Small Business Com-
mittee of the House of Representatives saidt
We are not convinced, however, that the lack of manpower
is the basic source of the present difficulty or that reform
can be achieved only through larger appropriations.
The conclusion reached by the committee in respect to the
need on the part of the PTC for additional funds presupposes
the maximum degree of operating efficiency and an ability to
render a dollar's worth of public service for each dollar
appropriated. Unfortunately, this high level of operating
efficiency does not exist today,
3
Although many, many examples can be cited of open attempts
of the FTC to exert greater power than that designed by the fram-
ers of the antitrust acts or the Congress, the following quota-
tion from one of their briefs would be sufficient to make any
businessman shrink with horror at the stated power.
The Commission is the trier of the facts, and its find-
ings if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive.
It is therefore of no consequence that, if Congress had
Lowell B, Mason, op. cit.
2Stephen J. Spingain in testimony before the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Monopoly Power, on H. R.
2820, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 25 (1951 ) as cited by Simon, op.
cit. , p. 329.
^House Report No. 3236, op. cit. , pp. 21, H, ^5.
h






conferred fact finding power upon the court, it might have
reached a conclusion other than that of the Commission.
The weight to be given to the evidence as well as the infer-
ences reasonably to be drawn therefrom is for the Commission
to determine, and the oossibility of drawing either of two
inconsistent inferences from the evidence does not prevent
the Commission from drawing one of them. 1
This power might best be described by once again using the
words of Commissioner Mason. In commenting on the FTC, he said
that it was "The most powerful concentration of bureaucratic power
over business in the world.
The courts, however, have not agreed to this power as was
pointed out in the "Law of Mergers." Fortune claims that Judge
Medina put an end to the FTC "fishing expedition" type of anti-
trust cases in September 1953 > by not even requiring the defendents
in the "investment banker" case to defend themselves and therefore
dismissed the case after five million words of FTC testimony.
While the case was dismissed, the businessman will remember the
$4 million in defense costs that accumulated over a period of six
years that the case was pending. The taxpayer might have even
more cause for concern if the total expense to the government could
be ascertained.
The Hoover Commission, The Small Business Committee, and
most writers on the subject have made many possible suggestions on
corrections for the situation the public finds itself in while
^•Brief for FTC, Bond Crown oc Cork Co. v. FTC, 176 F. 2nd
874 (19^9).
2
Lowell B. Mason, as cited in "A Businesslike Antitrust
Policy," Fortune , November 1953* P. 115.
J




dealing with the Federal Trade Commission. With modifications,
many of the critics of the Commission, including James M. Landis,
the former Commissioner, appear to be in general agreement with
Simon when he concludes:
The Federal Trade Commission^ orders should be subject
to review on the weight of the evidence, its economic func-
tions should be terminated and transferred to the Department
of Commerce ; and its antitrust activities should be trans-
ferred to the Department of Justice. The very minimum re-
quired for an intelligent, efficient and coordinated govern-
ment antitrust policy is that it be formulated at one agency -
this should be the Department of Justice. 1
The Case for the Federal Trade Commission
The proponents of the FTC make strong rebuttals against
those who suggest its abolition. As critical as the Hoover Com-
mission was it still suggested that there was a place for such an
agency and said, " [we] believe that the independent regulatory
commissions have a proper place in the machinery of our Govern-
ment, a place very like that originally conceived. 1 The critics
take this statement apart by suggesting that the Hoover Commission
only "believed" that such was the case and even then emphasized
that this should be "like that originally conceived." However,
the proponents point out that the Task Force Report of the Hoover
Commission went much further:
The independent regulatory commission is a useful and
desirable agency where constant adaptation to changing con-
ditions and delegation of wide discretion in administration
are essential to effective regulation.
We have carefully considered whether the FTC should be
Simon, op. cit. , p. 33&»
**The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch
of the Government, The Hoover Commission Report (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1949h p. 431.
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continued as an Independent regulatory commission, and espe-
cially whether its functions in the broad anti-monopoly field
should be transferred to the Department of Justice. Our con-
clusions, as already indicated, is that the Commission should
be maintained in order to implement the policy of the anti-
trust laws.*
The question might well be asked as to what other coun-
tries have in the way of regulatory commissions. It is readily
found that the United States is unique in this type of commission.
Under Socialism, the government exerts direct control much like
that used in administering our own public utilities. Under Com-
munism, there is no private business to be controlled] This be-
comes one of the strongest arguments for the retention of the Com-
mission. The substitute might well be socialism. Senator Paul
Douglas and Robert Wallace, in their answer to Simon's charges,
3tate this possibility very strongly:
The growth of monopoly power in the hands of private
corporations in this country will lead inevitably to monop-
oly power in the hands of government officials, with a cor-
responding lessening of individual freedom. 2
Douglas and Wallace take the side of the FTC in their
article entitled "Antitrust Policies and the New Attack on the
Federal Trade Commission," and endeavor to answer Simon's charges
item for item. In some cases they appear to do this quite con-
vincingly; in others they appear weak. An example is the dis-
missal of Commissioner Mason's charges by the remark that "The
nature of his recommendations, however, places them outside the
XHR Doc. No. 116, 8lst Cong., 1st Se3S., viil (app. N.1949)
and p. 123.
Robert A. Wallace and Paul H. Douglas, "Antitrust Poli-
cies and the New Attack on the Federal Trade Commission," Chicago
Law Review , Vol. 19, Summer 1952, No. 4, p. 723.
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scope of the Issues here under discussion, " Then there Is the dis-
missal of Commissioner Landis by the comment that he didn't say
that the functions of the Commission should be transferred, only
that the present FTC should be abolished, and Wallace and Douglas
Indicated this meant that Landis desired only to recreate the FTC.
It was the contention of these writers that the functions
of the Commission not only shouldn't be transferred or abolished
but should be vigorously maintained and increased for the good of
competition and the community. 2 They refute the point that the
Small Business Committee was against the Commission, although they
acknowledged that at times the Committee dealt harshly with the
Commission. They cited the Committee as chastising the Commission
for "losing some of its earlier enthusiasm" and weakening before
the pressures of "special Interests seeking to sell the public on
these systems. "^
In defending the Commission on the charges of confusion
over its legal position, Douglas and Wallace go to great pains to
prove that this condition was due to the "business interests."
They remark of the admitted confusion on the basing point system:
On the other hand, the business community had statements
to the contrary from no less a business authority than the
United States Steel Corporation. "Confusion" then became, the
new campaign slogan, and it was exploited to the fullest.*
^bld. , pp. 689, 690.
2Ibid. , p. 724.
3Ibld. , p. 687.
^Ibld. , p. 696.
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The authors then take up the challenge of lack of Informa-
tion In even stronger terms.
The Commission has been extensively Informative to busi-
ness. It has engaged successfully In trade practice conference
work for the last thirty years. . • . Such trade practice
rules have been worked out between the Commission and business
firms for more than 166 Industries.
What seems more nearly correct is that the Commission has
refused to give the kind of information Mr. Simon wishes it
to give.
Douglas and Wallace, as previously stated, made a good
case for the FTC. Their conclusion, however, appeared to be an
apology with a final appeal for condemnation of business on size
alone
i
. . . both the FTC and the Department of Justice are
needed. Administration of the antitrust laws, both in the
FTC and the Department of Justice, leaves much to be desired,
... We do not question that these criticisms are valid.
We cannot agree that Mr. Simmon's proposals would meet these
criticisms.
We insist, equally, that abuse of size ought to be re-
strained, so that success or failure in the competitive
struggle may be determined not by size, but by efficiency.
It is only under such a rule of competition that smaller
business firms can grow and prosper and that the door of
opportunity can be kept open. 2
Fortune also comes to the defense of the "new" FTC and
states that "the present Commission is more concerned with helping
business stay on the straight and narrow than with waiting for
firms to wander off and then pouncing on them. "3 The Fortune
article goes on to say:
FTC's new view of its functions seems to correspond to
that of experts like Myron Watkins, one of the leading
^frid. , p. 711.
2Ibid., p. 724.
3«A Businesslike Antitrust Policy," op. cit. , p. 115.
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authorities on antitrust, who believes that FTC is "fundamen-
tally a fact-finding body, empowered to eliminate the trade
abuses it finds, either by simple counsel or prosecution."
FTC was set up to forestall, not to punish, monopoly. More-
over, the functions of PTC and the Department of Justice have
seriously overlapped in the past, and the present intent is
to make them complement one another. 1
In the "Case Against the Federal Trade Commission, certain
Commissioners were quoted extensively in comments detrimental to
the Commission they represented. That all Commissioners are not
in agreement is quite evident. Commissioner John W. Qwynne defends
the FTC as follows:
It has often been pointed out that our various antimonop-
oly laws are vague and conflicting, and, in fact, sometimes
seem headed in different directions. Nevertheless, they all
are the product of a common aspiration,—the maintenance of
the competitive system. Among all the nations, we have placed
the greatest emphasis on competition. It is the cornerstone
of our economic structure. This must be kept constantly in
mind by all, who have any responsibility in regard to Section
"ft.
We must also keep in mind that the conditions under which
the competitive battle is now waged differ from those existing
in I89O or in 1914. • . . Competition is still essential but
it is competition under different rules.
The conclusion of the Congress was that mergers, however
brought about, which may substantially lessen competition con-
tained a threat to our economic system. • • • The end result,
whether good, bad, or insignificant will depend largely upon
the skill, the Judgment and the common sense of the bar, the
agencies, and the courts, whose duty it will be to wield this
weapon in the public interest. 2
Commissioner Edward Howrey had this to say on the duties
and responsibilities of the Bureau of Consultation, FTC:
The purpose of the Bureau is:
(l) To act in a cooperative and consultative capacity
to business, particularly small business;
XIbld.
John W. Owynne, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission,
paper presented before the Antitrust Section of the Illinois Bar




(2) To give Informal advice on all kinds of matters
Involving the laws administered by the Commission;
(3) To seek voluntary compliance with such laws by
means of conferences , Informal hearings and other
types of Informal procedures. 1
Cristopher, in his article in the Harvard Business Review
entitled "Use and Misuse of Authority by Federal Agencies/1 pointec
out that "you can secure changes and controls through administra-
tive agencies that you could never secure from Congress, and goes
on to describe the problems of interpreting tne regulations and of
bringing teBt cases in areas that have doubtful questions that
should be decided by the courts.
Cristopher, as noted under the "Case Against the Federal
Trade Commission," condemned it for its "one viewpoint idea."
His conclusion, however, is one that requires considerable thought 4
and one on which we can leave this section:
The danger with which businessmen should be actually con*
cerned is not that government agencies will destroy our demo-
cratic way of life or our system of private enterprise. The
danger is that the device of regulating by administrative
tribunals will prove defective and fail. If this should hap-




The case for and against business was covered to a con-
siderable extent in the chapter dealing with "Economics and Merg-
ers." There is more that can be added of a different nature, how-
ever.
Edward F. Howrey, Chairman, FTC, "Revaluation of Commis-
sion's Responsibilities, ' paper presented before the 1953 Insti-
tute Federal Antitrust Laws at the University of Michigan Law
School. Mimeo Report.
p
Cristopher, op. cit. , p. 53.
3Ibid. , p. 58.
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The Case Against Business
W. H. McComb, in The Businessman Must Save Himself , puts
a touch of humor in the case against the businessman by saying*
"Any defense counsel for the businessman must encounter a serious
difficulty. So many of the charges against him are true."
Stigler in "The Case Against Big Business, " remarks that
"The answer is that most giant firms arose out of mergers of many
competing firms, and were created to eliminate competition."
Once these giants are created Stigler goes on to say that the
"Fundamental criticisms to be made of big businesses are that they
act monopolistically, and they encourage and Justify bigness in
labor and government. "^
Many of Stigler' s anti-business comments were previously
quoted. If it were not for his position as Professor of Economics
at Columbia University, such comments would require considerable
questioning. His conclusions appear to require that questioning
regardless of his position:
The obvious and economical solution, ... is to break up the
giant companies. This, I would emphasize, is the minimum
program, and is essentially a conservative program.
The various charges against business of price-fixing,
price discrimination, ruinous competition to force competitors out
i
W. H. McComb, The Businessman Must Save Himself (New York
Harper & Brothers, 195*0* PP. 5* 6, as cited by J. K. Galbraith in
Harvard Business Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 2, March April 1954, p.
Stigler, op. clt. , p. 162.
3Ibid., p. 123.
rIbid. , p. 164.
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of business , mergers for monopoly purposes, and many others have
been proved true by the courts over the last half century. It
does not make good reading for the defenders of business.1 But
what of these recommendations by Stigler to "break up the giant
companies?" Is it an "economical solution?" Is it a "conserva-
tive program?" Certainly with all the prosperity that abounds in
the United States today, it appears to be a program that is based
more on Ideals than common sense.
The Case for Business
During the 1920* s the businessman and the capitalistic
system was riding the crest of the waves in spite of many charges
of wrongdoing. It was often commented upon that some of the lack
of competition was the price that had to be paid for progress.
This concept was quite generally accepted until the great depres-
sion of the thirties. It was then found that business and free
enterprise were not able to bring this country to the prosperity
that was expected of them. In fact, business soon was the scape-
goat for the depression itself.
Perhaps the war years rescued our economic system; perhaps
it would have resisted the trend toward socialism regardless of
whether or not there was a war. The latter is pure speculation,
but the prosperity that has come to this country since 19^5 and
the contemplated prosperity that lies ahead has once more brought
the businessman or "big business" back in favor to much of the
community. The question now is "Will big business and the free
enterprise system fail again?" If they do, even their strongest
backers agree that it might be their final chance.
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The problem that faces business is whether it will be al-
lowed to let the so called free enterprise system work. Edward
Mason comments that:
Among the intellectuals responsible for fomenting hostil-
ity to big business are those economists both in and out of
government who propound an anti-monopoly policy running in
terms of standards derived from a static analysis of the con-
ditions of pure competition. 1
Schumpeter stated, "Even if the giant concerns were all
managed so perfectly as to call forth applause from angels in
heaven, the political consequences of concentration would be what
they are.
Jerrold VanCise in the Chicago Law Review sets the stage
for the government's ideas of the rights of business:
Business should deal not with those with whom it wishes
to deal but with those with whom the government wishes it to
deal. It should buy, sell and license on a non discriminatory,!
non restrictive basis. Aggressive solicitation of new busi-
ness opportunities should be barred if the company is unduly
successful; instead industry should wait for business to be
thrust upon it. Finally, self-regulation of industry should
be so completely proscribed as to make government regulation
alone the vehicle for eliminating trade evils.
3
It is little wonder that business fears the environment
that it finds itself in. VanCise coined a phrase that perhaps
fits the picture. The sub-title to his article mentioned above
was "Trusts to Distrust." But does business merit the distrust?
The evidence appears to warrant a "case." Whether it has been
proved sufficiently to carry out Stigler f s recommendations is
Edward S. Mason, op. cit. , p. 144.
p
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy , op.
cit. , p. 140.
^Jerrold 0. VanCise, "The Modern Corporation and the Anti-





Qalbraith, in his "Defense of Business/' concludes:
Nor is the claim of competition necessary. While we
ascribe to it original virtues, in fact we are interested
only in the results of competition. On this, as in all
matters connected with the business case, it is final per-
formance that counts. And this, if any, is the present
lesson. If the business case must be offered, it had best
be based on performance - performance fully and carefully
argued, and directed not at those who are already disposed
to believe, but rather at those with a critical tendency to
disbelief.
McComb closes the case for the businessman with a picture
that bears considerable reflection:
When the great day comes in the people's supreme court,
the businessman may need a Clarence Darrow to defend him.
Darrow has saved some culprits whose plight appeared just
as desperate. ... We might expect to hear Darrow roar:
"Sure the businessman is guilty of a lot of things. Who
isn't? In the infinite processes of building this world of
ours, a lot of things have slipped. I file a warning. Before
you turn this defendant over to the Commissars, I want to re-
mind you of what he has been building while the rest of us
were talking; and I have a few words to say about those pink-
punks who want to take over the business."*
Public Policy
Edward Mason has emphasized that, in anti-monopoly work
of most other countries, abuse of power is attacked and not market
power per se, as is done in this country. ^ in addition, when the
Federal Communications Commission approved the Columbia Broad-
casting System of color television and denied the Radio Corpora-
tion of America the right to produce a competitive product it
1Galbraith, The Defense of Business: A Strategic Ap-
praisal," op. cit. , p. 43.
McComb, op. cit. , pp. 5-6.
^Edward S. Mason, op. cit. , p. 140.
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looked little like a policy of free enterprise. When the Civil
Aeronautics Board approves a line for Pan American Airways and
bars any other airline to the route it likewise appears that com-
petition has left the American scene under government compulsion.
It is paradoxical for the United States Government to continue to
approve more and more government monopolistic ideas in public
utilities* agriculture, and industry, while continuing to deny
that there might be "good" monopolies or oligopolies in industry,
Kaplan and Kahn in their previously quoted book Big Busi-
ness in a Competitive Society state;
Mergers and integration, though obviously departures
from pure competition, can no more than business size be
regarded as having been predominantly anti-competitive in
their consequences. A public policy that is hostile to .
integration per se is on balance an anti-competitive policy.
It should be the policy of this government to encourage
socially desirable mergers and to discourage the socially unde-
sirable mergers. As McLean and Haigh say, "If we limit the types
of growth that corporations may undertake, we may reduce the vigor
of competition in our industrial society."2
In speaking of the public policy that is being followed
by this government, Sumner Slichter commented:
Legal limits on the proportion of business that an enter-
prise may do would compel some concerns to behave like monop-
olies—no matter how far from being monopolies they might be.
They would be compelled to be interested in making money by
charging a higher price rather than by increasing their sales.
If concerns are to be broken up because they do too large a
business it should only be those concerns that are behaving
monopollstically by not attempting to grow at the expense of
Kaplan and Kahn, op. cit. , p. 13.
2McLean and Haigh, op. cit. , p. 8l.
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rivals. There is no reason to break up enterprises that are
behaving as good competitors should behave—namely attempting
to grow faster than the rest of the industry. 1
Summary
In commenting on the present trend of fewer mergers, Blair
and Houghton made a statement that might describe a summary for
the present controversy between the government, the businessman,
and the public. They said:
It is not so much to the absence of "new worlds to conquerj
but to other explanations such as the greater sense of public
responsibility on the part of businessmen, the changed char-
acter of competition, and the more effective policing action
of the Dept. of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission •
that one must look for the main explanation of the relatively
much smaller scope of the recent merger movement. 2
If this is so, then perhaps a compromise has come about
without formal recognition. That such a compromise is necessary
is without question and in the mechanics of such agreement VanCise
concludes:
Why either business or government should claim infalli-
bility is a mystery understood only by its devotees, as each
in the last analysis is merely a corporate fiction describing
an aggregation of fallible human beings.
3
Sumner H. Slichter, What's Ahead for American Business
(Cambridge s Harvard University Press, 1951 )» PP. 117, 118.
clair and Houghton, op. clt. , p. 68.
3




"Listening to the opposite views of the businessman and the
economist in our attempt to comprehend the complex phenome-
non of modern competition, we are reassured* • • • The
bogy of bigness and the Spenglerian specter of inevitable
decay of competition can both have decent burial,
Joel Dean, Harvard Business Review ,
November-December 1952, p. 63.
The mass of contradiction that has been presented within
these pages is convincing proof that there are three powerful op-
posing views on the subject of industrial mergers. It has been
seen that William Simon recommends abolishment of the FTC. He
has many adherents. Taking a moderate position is M. A. Adelman
who states, "But clearly the results presented in this paper do
not imply that public policy ought to be modified or, in particu-
lar, that antitrust policy should be changed." Qeorge Stigler,
on the extreme left, recommends the abolishment of big business]
Moreover, John Blair indicates that conditions at this moment,
more than ever before, show that the PTC f s original fear of merg-
ers and big business (as expressed in its 19^8 report) was cor-
rect.
Conclusions
The conclusions reached as a result of this study are:
1Adelman, The Measurement of Industrial Concentration,"
op. clt. , p. 296.





1. Mergers have cyclical tendencies. In the past, the
peaks of these cycles have been associated with high
stock prices and good business.
2. Any projection at this time of future numbers of
mergers or their resulting effect on industrial con-
centration would undoubtedly contain results as er-
roneous as those published by Berle and Means in
1934. The history of mergers is far from complete
but so also is the data that must be used to project
their effect on the future economy of the nation.
3. The reasons for the present merger movement encompass
much of the history and legal aspects of the past
merger movements. The stage has been set by the in-
ability of the Federal Trade Commission to get sub-
stantial backing by the courts. In addition, evidence
was found to indicate that the Congress was respon-
sible for much of the current activity through the en-
actment of tax laws that favor merging companies in
many cases. Low price-earning ratios of common stocks
,
a desire to achieve rapid production expansion in
order to increase sales in a strong sellers' market,
and the need for raw materials or business protection
have caused their share of combinations.
The greatest single reason was found to be the demands
placed on the managers of Industry to keep up with
T3erle and Means, op. cit. , pp. 40, 41.
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competition and to grow in the spirit of successful
business. One of the fastest and most profitable ways
to meet competition and growth problems is through
merger.
4. There appears to be duplication and mixed Jurisdiction
between the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission in the control of mergers.
5. The Federal Trade Commission has appeared to disregard
its intended purpose and has embarked on a program of
business harassment.
6. There is considerable confusion over the intent and
use of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. That the govern-
ment has found appropriate rules for the conduct of
business is questionable.
7. The advent of big business has changed the classical
ideas of competition. Pure competition could not
serve society as well as the "workable competition"
theory of today.
3. The success (measured by social as well as business
standards) of many mergers is as questionable as are
the efficiency and the advantages of many large busi-
ness enterprises. (It is difficult, however, to say
that big business has not been effective]
)
9. If internal growth of big business actually exceeds
external growth by approximately nine to one, no
InAdelman, The Measurement of Industrial Concentration,





serious consequences upon our economy or business
structure will result from mergers.
10. The evidence does not substantiate the Federal Trade
Commission's claim that industrial concentration as
a result of mergers is Increasing at an alarming rate*
11. Business has been guilty of many practices which re-
quire appropriate laws and governmental controls for
the public welfare. At the same time, it has contrib-
uted to the unprecedented growth in the economy of
this nation in a manner that doesn't appear to war-
rant the environment in which it finds itself.
12. Public policy has been unnecessarily hostile to in-
dustrial mergers. That there can be good mergers
with beneficial results must be recognized by the
agencies of government.
13. The problem if there is one, is not mergers per se
but what mergers will tend to substantially monopo-
lize a market. Sufficient, up-to-date, and unbiased
data is not available to bring the opposing views
into agreement at the present time.
The question is basic; "Shall mergers be permitted or
not? It is believed John Clark supplies the answer:
. . . many people can see one or the other of these propo-
sitions. It is harder to see both, and hardest of all to see
how they can be fitted together. Yet a healthy economy re-
quires some tolerable and workable resolution of this incom-
patability. It must obviously be an Imperfect adjustment,
and almost as obviously a moving and changing one. 1
John M. Clark, Guldeposts in Time of Change (New York:




As a result of the stated conclusions to this study the
following recommendations are made:
1. That the Federal Trade Commission be accepted as the
logical agency for the control of business. However,
such acceptance must come wholeheartedly from the Con-
gress, the Courts, other governmental agencies, and
business. Such acceptance will enhance its prestige
in such a manner as to bear sufficient weight to per-
mit the Commission to carry out its charter.
2. That sufficient, properly paid, and appropriate staffs
be made available to the Federal Trade Commission.
Its inability to check properly on mergers and their
effects and to properly advise and aid business appears
to be directly attributable to the lack of qualified
personnel.
3. That the duplication between the Commission and the
Department of Justice be ended. The Commission's area
of operation should be limited to aid to business, in-
vestigation, administrative findings, and cease and
desist orders under both the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
The Department of Justice should be limited to prose-
cution under the Acts on request of the Commission.
4. That the Commission institute an extensive program of
making public its orders and policies.
5. That the Congress use every possible means within its
power to determine the best way in which to control
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the growth of business by way of merger , if, in fact,
it is found that it needs control. Such considerations
should reject the contention that there be a limit to
the size of business. The Congress has recognized
good monopolies in almost every field but industry.
It is high time that appropriate recognition be given
to this area.
6. That the Congress make funds available to respected
agencies , such as the Committee for Economic Develop-
ment, for the continuing study of the problem by in-
dependent groups.
7. That a commission, much like the Hoover Commission
(and unlike the Temporary National Economic Committee),
be established to review all the present investiga-
tions, "facts" and controversy so that the Congress
may be properly advised of the situation on an im-
partial basis.
8. That, once appropriate rules and regulations have been
made and concerted attempts made to place a coordi-
nated program before business, penalties for willful
failure to comply be considerably heavier than they
are at present.
9. That present litigation procedures be considerably
speeded up in practice so that costs to government
and business be on a more economical scale.
As suggested among others, by The Committee on Cartels &
Monopoly, as cited by Stocking and Watkins, op. cit. , p. 564.
.
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10. That, until appropriate rules for business are laid
down and followed by the FTC, the government be re-
quired to pay for defense costs when cases brought
to trial result in the acquittal of the defendant,
11. That a cautious attitude be taken in condemning in-
dustrial mergers per se, and the "rule of reason" be
the major consideration in their acceptance or re-
jection.
The Committee on Cartels and Monopoly of the Twentieth
Century Fund has this to say about the problem:
The problems confronting antitrust keep changing from indus-
try to industry from day to day. If competition is to be
preserved, the organization and practices of business, market
by market, must be the subject of extensive and continual in-
vestigation by both public and private agencies. Otherwise,
for want of knowledge, policy will be misdirected or will go
by default. Eternal vigilance is the price of free enter-
prise. 1
*The Committee on Cartels and Monopoly, as cited by
Stocking and Watkins, op. clt. , p. 569.
.
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I would be glad to help out on the question of
mergers even if I had to give you an unofficial
guess, but I find when our staff advised you the
statistics were "unavailable" they weren't being
coy, because the truth is we Just don't have any.
I understand even when Congress asked us for some
estimate, our Bureau of Economics was unable to
furnish any.
So it looks like your guess is as good as ours.
You would think that in view of the plethora of
mergers that receive notice in the press, our Bureau
of Economics ought to be able to come up with some-
thing.
Well, that f s Government for you.
With kindest regards.
Sincerely yours,




THE REPORT OP THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 1 S NATIONAL COMMITTEE
TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS
On July 9, 1953* Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr.,
created the National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws. Its
goal was stated to be* "a thoughtful and comprehensive study of
our antitrust laws." 1 The President of the United States added
his blessings and expressed the hope that the Committee would
"provide an important instrument to prepare the way for moderniz-
ing and strengthening our laws to preserve American free enter-
prise against monopoly and unfair competition.
"
2
The Chairman of the Committee was Stanley N. Barnes,
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice, and the Co-Chairman was S. Chester-
field Oppenheim, Professor of Law, University of Michigan. The
membership of the Committee was selected to reflect "interacting
views on issues of antitrust policy. *' This membership included
among others, M. A. Adelman, Edward F. Howrey, Alfred E. Kahn,
William Simon, Sumner H. Slichter, George J. Stigler, and Jer-
rold G. VanCise. All of these men have been quoted throughout
the thesis and their views on the subject of mergers and anti-
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to










monopoly work are well represented.
In reference to mergers, the majority opinion of the Com-
mittee is reflected in the following:
Summing up, then, mergers are a common form of growth;
they may lessen, increase, or have no effect upon competition,
A merger as such involves no necessary connotations of coer-
cion, dominance, or lack of effective competitive pressures.
In addition, mergers may ease from the market companies which
have failed in the competitive struggle and thus prevent po-
tential bankruptcies. Finally they may spur operating econo-
mies by spreading overhead costs or enabling improved tech-
nology or management.
Similarly, in a vertical acquisition, the fact that com-
petitors of one company are foreclosed from selling to the
other need of itself signal no reasonable probability of a
substantial lessening of competition or tendency to monopoly.
On the contrary, the integration may create a company better
able to compete with larger rivals. In addition, it may mean
economies which in a competitive market may spell consumer
savings. The question therefore is not merely whether com-
petitors of either of the merging companies are denied access
to outlets or sources of supply but whether companies compet-
ing, buying, or selling in the markets in which either company
operated may, as a result of the acquisition, face a substan-
tial lessening in their opportunity to take independent com-
petitive action.
This analysis required by Section 7 is no more beyond the
competence of the courts than the Federal Trade Commission.
For both, the following market factors may be helpful in de-
termining the competitive consequences of any particular ac-
quisition. Ve do not, of course, imply that all, several, or
any one of these guides may be significant or even relevant in
a given case.
It may be relevant, however, to study: (l) The character
of the acquiring and the acquired company, (2) the character-
istics of the markets affected, (3) immediate changes in the
size and competitive range of the acquiring company and in the
adjustments of other companies operating in the markets di-
rectly affected, and (k) probable long-range differences that
the acquisition may make for companies actually or potentially
operating in these markets. . . .
Initially relevant are the salient characteristics of the
merging companies. These include: the size of each (meas-
ured perhaps by assets, total sales, total capacity, etc.);
their major products; location of their plants; geographic
market areas in which each sells or buys; their methods of
sale, and classes of customers; sales of major products in
major markets prior to the acquisition; special technologies
or know-how; and growth history.
^
•Ibld. , pp. 124-125.
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The minority opinion of the Committee, which was repre-
sented by only a few members, is expressed by Walter Adams:
Section 7 condemns mergers not only where they lead in the
direction of oligopoly or monopoly, but also where their ef-
fect "may be to substantially lessen competition." The test
is whether the amount of competition lost is substantial, or
whether competition has been foreclosed or eliminated from a
significant segment of the market. The Clayton Act is a pro-
hibitory, not a regulatory statute. By its enactment, Con-
gress did not intend to authorize the courts or the Commission
to determine whether particular mergers are good or bad or in
the public interest. Instead, Congress acted on the presump-
tion that a substantial foreclosure or elimination of competi-
tion was in itself a derogation of the public interest. Once
we accept the notion that small companies may merge to compete
more effectively with the large ones, or that large companies
may merge to compete more effectively with the giants, we are
in fact inviting the proliferation of oligopoly. This could
hardly have been, the intent of Congress, and I am persuaded
that it was not.
Eugene V. Rostow, another dissenter, states:
Thus we have not commented even on the conspicuous fail-
ure of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion to undertake seriously the enforcement of Section 7 of
the Clayton Act. In the midst of a merger movement raising ob-
vious antitrust questions in almost every day's newspaper, it
is, in my view, a defect of the Report that we have not urged
prompt action in an appropriate case to obtain an authorita-
tive clarification of Section 7.
Louis B. Schwartz, the major dissenter, sums up for the
minority:
... we are presented with an excellent technical analysis
and a series of proposals many of which standing alone would
seem reasonable enough. But when they are all added together
the total effect of the recommendations is clear: to restrict
the Antitrust Division's power of investigation, to curtail
use of criminal prosecutions, to slow up the filing of com-
plaints, to encumber the exercise of prosecutor's discretion
with novel internal administrative reviews on request of a
defendant, to expand the use of the consent decree in a manner
calculated to remove the last possibility of public scrutiny
1Ibid. , pp. 127-128
2Ibid. , p. 386.
.
182
of this useful but dangerous practice which, among other
things, shields the defendants from damage suits by private
parties, to water down the threat of treble damage recovery,
etc.*
Representative Wright Patman of the House Small Business
Committee was one of the first, outside the minority committee
members, to attack the report. He stated, "The Committee should
be investigated as a high-pressure private lobby operating under
White House sanctions ... to get the antitrust laws repealed."*
Representative Cellar of the House Judiciary Committee stated that
the Committee's recommendations "advocate a substantial weakening
of the antitrust laws."^ However, Representative Cellar did
praise much of the report.
By the nature of the minority reports and the challenge
made by Representative Patman, it appears that in the months ahead
many opinions of the report will be expressed both pro and con.
It can suffice here to repeat the comment made early in the "Intro
auction" that the new investigations are unlikely to bring forth
any new solutions or radical departure from the old.
1Ibld. , p. 388.
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